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Venkat lyer* States of Emergency -
Moderating their Effects on
Human Rights
There has been a runaway proliferation of emergency regimes worldwide in
recent decades. This, coupled with the high incidence of human rights abuses
which accompany them, has made states of emergency a matter of increasing
concern among human rights policymakers and monitors. The author evaluates
the various measures that have been taken by the international community to
moderate the effects of emergencies, and outlines possible future strategies to
increase the effectiveness of such measures.
Au cours des derni6res d6cennies, nous avons assist6 I une prolifdration
effr6nde des r6gimes d'urgence partout dans le monde. Les responsables de
I'dlaboration et du respect des droits de la personne lorgnent avec inquidtude ce
ph6nom6ne qui s'accompagne d'une mont6e des abus des droits de la personne.
L'auteur 6value les diverses mesures prises par la communaut6 internationale
pourmitigerles retomb6es des 6tats d'urgence etpropose des strat6gies futures
qui pourraient 6ventuellement accroltre I'efficacit&6 de ces mesures.
* B.Sc. (Hons), LL.M., Ph.D., Lecturer in Law, University of Ulster at Jordanstown,
Northern Ireland.
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States of emergency have increasingly engaged the attention of lawyers,
academics and policymakers concerned with the protection of human
rights. One reason is that human rights have been seen to be at much
greater risk during emergencies, real or imagined, than during periods of
relative normality.' The subject has also attracted growing interest on
account of the proliferation of emergency regimes2 throughout the world
in recent years, many of them of questionable provenance.' Of particular
concern is the occurrence of informal states of emergency because they
present difficult problems of amenability to international control.4
1. The validity of this generalization depends, of course, on how one defines "normality." As
will be shown later, there are some jurisdictions where the "normality" itself is deeply
antithetical to respect for human rights, e.g., countries which are under "permanent" or
"institutionalized" states of emergency, in which case the generalization fails.
2. The term "emergency regime" will, for the sake of convenience, be used throughout this
article synonymously with "emergency government," except where the context indicates
otherwise.
3. The United Nations appointed Special Rapporteur on the subject listed, in his annual report
published in 1996, 87 countries which have experienced emergency rule at one time or another
since 1 January 1985. He acknowledged that this list may not be exhaustive by recognizing the
possibility of "the existence of a state of emergency in other countries [which] might not have
come to his knowledge"-UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1996/19, 7-32, at paras. 32-38. As the
Special Rapporteur graphically observed in an earlier report, "If the list of countries that have
proclaimed, extended or lifted a state of emergency during the past 10 years ... were transposed
onto a world map it would be disturbing to note that it would cover almost three quarters of the
Earth's surface, and that no region would be left out."-UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.21995/20, 5 at
para. 11.
4. Defacto emergencies involve either "the adoption of exceptional measures without a state
of emergency having previously been proclaimed" or "the maintenance of exceptional
measures after [a] state of emergency has been officially lifted"-see UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/
1993/23, 35, at para. 23. Institutionalized emergencies, on the other hand, involve the
incorporation into "ordinary" law of exceptional measures before a state of emergency is
formally terminated, and their continuation thereafter.
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This article will examine the legal and practical justification for
emergency powers, and trace the history of their evolution in interna-
tional law. It will describe recent and ongoing efforts by intergovernmen-
tal and non-governmental organizations to moderate the effects of
emergency regimes on human rights. An attempt will also be made to
analyze the effectiveness of provisions in the major international human
rights instruments designed to control the abuse of emergency powers.
The discussion will also encompass suggestions for improvement of the
existing system of controls on the exercise of such powers, at both
international and domestic levels.
Emergency rule-or crisis government, as it is often generically
called-is not a recent phenomenon. The concept has been in existence
for almost as long as organized government itself. Juridically, it is based
on the principle of necessity, which recognizes the right of every
sovereign state to take all reasonable steps needed to protect and preserve
the integrity of the state - a right whose importance has been underlined
by writers and philosophers down the centuries. Spinoza believed that
"the virtue of a State is its stability,"5 while Rousseau was of the opinion
that "the people's first intention is that the state shall not perish."6 Bracton
declared that "what is not otherwise lawful necessity makes lawful."7
Machiavelli made out a strong case for emergency powers by arguing
that, in the absence of such powers, "a strict observance of the established
laws [in any Republic] will expose her to ruin."8 Even Thomas Jefferson,
a staunch advocate of limited government, agreed that:
The laws of necessity, of self-preservation, of saving our country when in
danger, are of higher obligation. To lose our country by a scrupulous
adherence to written law, would be to lose the law itself, with life, liberty,
property and those who are enjoying them with us; thus absurdly sacrific-
ing the end to the means.'
In medieval times, emergency powers were handed down by the ruling
princes to "commissioners" appointed under royal prerogative. These
functionaries exercised such powers on the basis of special instructions
which were tailored to meet specific exceptional situations. A similar
system operated in ancient Rome, but here the functionary concerned
5. Tractatus Politicus, i, 6, p. 265, cited in A.G. Wernham, Benedictde Spinoza: The Political
Works (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958) 38.
6. Social Contract, IV, 6, quoted in C.L. Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship: Crisis
Government in the Modern Democracies (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1979) 12.
7. "Id quod alias non est licitum, necessitas licitumfacit," cited in G. Williams, "The Defence
of Necessity" [ 1953] Curr. Leg. Probs. 216 at 218.
8. Discourses, XXXIV.
9. P.L. Ford, ed., The Writings of Thomas Jefferson (New York: G.P. Putnam, 1893) 9:279-80.
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enjoyed much wider powers and was called a "dictator." The dictator was
often given complete charge of running the state after being entrusted
with a specific task such as prosecuting a war or suppressing a rebellion.
A noteworthy feature of the system was the strictly temporary nature of
the arrangement: no sooner had the dictator executed the task entrusted
to him than he would lay down his office and the state would return to its
normal functioning. 10 So effective was the institution that, in the opinion
of one writer, the dictatorship "remained a bulwark for the Republican
government and it did not lead to a usurpation of powers."" Another
writer has called it "the most unique and successful constitutional
emergency institution in all recorded history."12
This tradition of emergency rule has been transmitted down the
centuries by successive generations of rulers and today finds expression
in almost all political systems. There is hardly any modern constitution
which does not recognize the right of the executive to suspend the normal
rules of government, including the rights and freedoms of citizens, during
periods of crisis. 13 Legal commentators have sometimes argued about the
nature of such powers. Some believe that they represent a means to
"preserve a constitutional state in the face of crisis while nonetheless
requiring that it respond through measures consistent with its constitu-
tional heritage."' 4 Others assert that they represent "an extra-constitu-
tional resort to raw political power, necessary but not lawful."' 5 A few
have questioned the need for such powers, arguing that "even our liberal,
democratic world, is full of young Marines-sometimes they are politi-
cians, sometimes policemen, sometimes judges, sometimes soldiers-
10. A celebrated example was that of Lucius Quinctius Cincinnatus, an elderly farmer, who
was asked by the Roman Senate in 458 B.C. to save the Republic from a potentially devastating
attack on government forces by a central Italian tribe. Despite being made absolute dictator,
Cincinnatus willingly and voluntarily relinquished all his powers sixteen days after he had
assumed them, following his success in repelling the attack. He then quietly returned to his
farm; see, e.g., Rossiter, supra note 6 at 16.
11. C.J. Friedrich, Constitutional Government and Democracy (Massachusetts: Blaisdell
Publishing Co., 1968) 559.
12. Rossiter, supra note 6 at 28.
13. The crises covered normally include war, natural disasters, economic emergency, and
secessionist, insurrectionary or subversive violence. For the purposes of this study, however,
crises arising from natural disasters and economic emergency will be excluded, unless
otherwise indicated.
14. J.E. Finn, Constitutions in Crisis: Political Violence and the Rule of Law (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1991) 17.
15. A.M. Schlesinger, Jr., quoted in J.M. Bessette & J. Tulis, The Presidency in The
Constitutional Order (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1981) 22.
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who would destroy us to save us: they are as much to be guarded against
as those against whom they would protect us."' 6
A wide range of terminology has been used to describe the crises
situations which justify resort to extraordinary measures: some examples
are state of emergency, state of civil emergency, state of siege, state of
war, state of internal war, state of exception, state of public danger, state
of catastrophe, state of tension, state of alarm, state of urgency, state of
national defence, state of national necessity, state of special powers, state
of suspension of guarantees, general or partial mobilization, military
regime, and martial law. The nomenclature adopted varies from consti-
tution to constitution, and is often the product of a country's specific
historical experiences. Some constitutions provide for more than one
type of emergency rule, to allow the government greater flexibility of
response, depending on the intensity of the crisis confronting it. 7 The
variety of terms have been compendiously described as constituting
"exceptional circumstances," namely,
circumstances resulting from temporary factors of a generally political
character which in varying degrees involve extreme and imminent danger,
threatening the organised existence of a nation, that is to say, the political
and social system that it comprises as a State, and which may be defined
as follows: 'a crisis situation affecting the population as a whole and
constituting a threat to the organised existence of the community which
forms the basis of the State."'
Whatever the nomenclature used, there are at least two broad features
common to all emergency regimes: a significant increase in the powers
of the executive branch of government, to the detriment of the legislative
and judicial branches, and an abridgement or suspension of the rights and
freedoms enjoyed by the citizenry. As often as not, these measures are
16. C. Warbrick, "The Protection of Human Rights in National Emergencies" in F.E.
Dowrick, ed., Human Rights: Problems, Perspectives and Texts (Farnborough: Saxon Press,
1979) 89 at 106.
17. Given the profusion of terminology, most writers on the subject use an omnibus heading
such as 'states of emergency' or 'states of exception' to denote the entire range of emergency
powers. Joan Fitzpatrick, for example, prefers the expression "states of emergency" because
it "possesses the advantages of breadth of reference to a wide variety of factual circumstances,
de-emphasis upon any particular pattern of formal legal alterations, stress upon the temporary
crisis aspect of the situation, and a hint of danger"; see J. Fitzpatrick, Human Rights in Crisis:
The International System for Protecting Rights During States of Emergency (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994) 1. That phrase will be used in the present article also
to describe emergency regimes generically, unless the context requires otherwise.
18. N. Questiaux, Study of the Implications for Human Rights of Recent Developments
concerning Situations known as States of Siege or Emergency, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1982/
15,8.
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also accompanied by massive grants of powers to the military and other
security forces, including immunity from prosecution for acts carried out
by them in furtherance of the emergency rule.
The similarities notwithstanding, it is possible to identify certain
characteristics peculiar to one or more of the above mentioned forms of
crisis government. A clear distinction can be drawn between, for ex-
ample, a state of siege, which is essentially a civil law construct, and
martial law, which owes its origin to the English common law. Whereas
the former is a creature of statute, and is usually initiated by a specific,
often detailed, declaration by the legislature or the head of the govern-
ment, the latter is a much more flexible concept whose initiation requires
no special formality. 19 Secondly, the task of checking abuses during a
state of siege is usually assigned to the legislature, while under martial
law that responsibility falls to the courts. Thirdly, common law courts
also perform, at least in theory, a more vigorous function to retroactively
correct individual past abuses after a martial law regime has ended, in a
way that courts in civil law countries seldom do.2" Fourthly, some
commentators have argued that declarations of martial law tend to be less
comprehensive than states of siege, in terms both of their territorial reach
and their objectives.2'
It is possible to identify yet another, more distinct, form of emergency
rule applicable in countries such as the United Kingdom which do not
have a written constitution. This consists of the use of ordinary, often
permanent, legislation passed by Parliament which authorizes a concen-
tration of power in the hands of the executive during periods of crisis. The
most famous example of such legislation is the Defence of the Realm
Consolidation Act, 1914 (DORA),22 enacted by the British Parliament
19. C.J. Friedrich found the law of martial law to be vague and obscured by a maze of conflicting
precedents. "Although it is customary," he said, "for the executive 'to declare martial law' before
initiating extraordinary measures, this declaration does not entail any very definite consequences.
It may be a mere threat. It may presage the most extreme measures, violating all the customary
limitations upon governmental powers"; Friedrich, supra note 11 at 561.
20. In civil law countries such abuses are usually rectified by legislation prospectively. This
difference between a state of siege and martial law is less significant than might appear at first
glance because, in practice, the record of common law courts in correcting past abuses is not
particularly commendable. Usually, legislatures in common law countries enact legislation at
the end of martial law periods which confer immunity from prosecution for acts carried out
during martial law.
21. See, e.g., J.B. Kelly & G.A. Pelletier, Jr., "Theories of Emergency Government" (1966)
11 South Dakota L. Rev. 42 at 56-57. The authors point out that: "Seldom is martial law
applicable to an entire country, while such application is not uncommon for the state of siege.
Martial law does not encompass the authority to order total economic planning for the nation,
something which was done in France in World War I under the state of siege power."
22. 1914 (U.K.) 4 & 5 Geo. V, c.29.
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soon after the commencement of World War I, which allowed the British
Cabinet to make regulations on a wide range of subjects dealing with
public safety and the defence of the realm for the duration of the war. Such
regulations were subject to little legislative or judicial scrutiny,23 and
effectively resulted in rule by executive decree which was no different in
its comprehensiveness from a classic state of siege.24 DORA was revived
during World War II and, subject to certain modifications, 25 used just as
effectively as it had been during the Great War.
Why are states of emergency important as a discrete subject of study?
From a practical point of view, the answer is obvious: because of their
close connection with the incidence of grave and widespread violations
of human rights. 26 That link, it would be fair to say, has now been
sufficiently firmly established to put the question beyond any doubt,27
although it would be wrong to generalize too much and attribute every
case of gross and systematic violation of human rights to an emergency
regime. Indeed,
Many individual rights and interests are much more systematically abused
in wartime than in other states of emergency, though it is not entirely clear
that all these constitute breaches of human rights. And in some totalitarian
regimes some individual and collective rights are more systematically
ignored in 'normal' times than during states of emergency in other
regimes. Total repression can be maintained by relatively peaceful means
for long periods, as [was the case] in South Africa and some eastern
European [countries].
28
23. They could, in theory, be challenged before the courts as being ultra vires, but such
challenges were rarely successful: see, e.g., King v. Halliday, [1917] A.C. 260.
24. Kelly and Pelletier, supra note 21 at 60-61.
25. This time, as well as giving Parliament the right to annul regulations within 28 days of
their issuance, the Act expressly prohibited military or industrial conscription, and the trial of
civilians by courts-martial. The last two prohibitions were, however, lifted by subsequent
legislation.
26. As a leading study carried out by the International Commission of Jurists pointed out,
"The most serious violations [of human rights] tend to occur in situations of tension when those
in power are, or think they are, threatened by forces which challenge their authority if not the
established order of the society"; States of Emergency: Their Impact on Human Rights
(Geneva: International Commission of Jurists, 1983) i.
27. See, e.g., Amnesty International, States of Emergency: Torture and Violations of the
Right to Life under States of Emergency (London: July 1988, Al Index: POL 30/02/88) which
revealed gross violations of those two non-derogable rights in eight representative countries
then under a state of emergency (Egypt, Jordan, Pakistan, Peru, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Syria
and Turkey).
28. T. Hadden, C. Campbell & K.S. Venkateswaran, Monitoring Human Rights Abuses: The
Role of a Database on States of Emergency (unpublished paper presented to a conference held
at the Queen's University of Belfast, April 1991, copy on file with the author) 1.
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Besides, the phenomenon of defacto, i.e. undeclared, emergency regimes
and other ambiguous situations29 also poses complex problems and raises
serious questions about an exclusive reliance on the concept of states of
emergency in the global quest to end human rights violations.
That said, it would be folly to dismiss out of hand the relevance of states
of emergency, at least in strategic terms, to the international campaign for
better human rights protection. Clearly, there are benefits to be gained by
focusing on states of emergency and studying their effects on human
rights. For one thing, it will help identify the flaws, deficiencies and
lacunae present in the existing international-largely treaty based-
mechanisms for the protection and promotion of human rights-which
do recognize the concept explicitly-and to rectify those weaknesses
wherever possible. For another, it will, as Joan Fitzpatrick suggests, offer
guidance on devising newer non-treaty based universal standards which
could be made binding on all states regardless of whether they sign them
or not. The process would also help in creating "model legislation that
could be voluntarily adopted by states as a preventive measure against
future abuse of human rights during emergencies, particularly by states
undergoing a process of democratization after a long period of repres-
sion. '30 A focus on states of emergency may also be useful in a further
preventive way in that, because the existence or imminence of an
emergency situation is usually a good predictor of human rights abuses,
close attention to their use may serve as an early warning system.
It needs to be recognized, of course, that there are formidable obstacles
to be overcome in carrying out any meaningful study of states of
emergency and their impact on human rights. These include: the vast field
of study, given the number, diversity and complexity of emergency
regimes extant at any given point of time; definitional problems arising
from the profusion and inexactitude of terminology employed in different
legal systems and regions; difficulties in establishing clear causal rela-
tionships between states of emergency and particular human rights
violations or particular patterns of violations; wide variations in the
standards laid down in existing regional and international instruments on
29. For a good discussion of such situations, see Second Interim Report of the International
Law Association Committee on the Enforcement of Human Rights Law (London: International
Law Association, 1988) 12-25 [hereinafter "Second Interim Report"].
30. Fitzpatrick, Human Rights in Crisis, supra note 17 at 50. One attempt at drafting such
model legislation was made by a meeting of experts convened by a non-governmental
organization, the Association of Consultants on Human Rights, at Geneva in March 1991-
see Guidelines for the Development of Legislation on States of Emergency, UN Doc. E/CN.4/
Sub.2/1991/28, Annex 1, 30-60. The UN Special Rapporteur on States of Emergency endorsed
the need for such model provisions in his third annual report; see UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/30/
Rev. I at 10-11 (paras. 28-34).
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human rights; and, a lack of consensus on the rights and freedoms which
need to be protected during periods even of acute crisis.
Many of these problems have, not surprisingly, bedevilled efforts to
devise an effective system of international supervision and control of
states of emergency and related regimes. Such mechanisms as have been
put in place in recent decades are increasingly seen as weak and incapable
of tackling the myriad problems thrown up by the bewilderingly diverse
and complex range of emergency regimes that have sprung up over the
years.
I. States of Emergency and International Law
States of emergency were not, until recently, the subject of any special
concern in international law. The only exceptional situation addressed by
the earlier systematic mechanisms for the protection for human rights was
war, and the approach here was, by and large, to accept that individual
rights and freedoms had to be subordinated to the interests of states in
wartime. Hence the rather limited protection afforded to civilians in the
Geneva Conventions of 194931 which merely require that those not
taking any active part in hostilities be treated humanely and without
discrimination.32
The first deliberate attempt to specifically address the question of
emergencies other than war came in 1950 when the Council of Europe
began putting together the European Convention on Human Rights.
3
The architects of this document introduced the concept of "derogation"
34
which meant that states parties could legally suspend their obligation to
respect and enforce the rights contained in the convention during times
of "war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation."
Some rights were, however, made strictly "non-derogable" on the grounds
that they were too fundamental and too precious to be dispensed with
31. Art. 3, common to the Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field; Conventionfor the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded Sick and Ship-wrecked Members ofArmed Forces at Sea; Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War; and Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons
in Time of War, all dated 12 August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, 85, 135 & 287 respectively. These
provisions are collectively known as "Common Article 3."
32. These protections were further elaborated in the Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions ofAugust 12, 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International
Armed Conflicts ("Protocol II"), 8 June 1977, 75 U.N.T.S. 31.
33. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
4 November 1950, in force 3 September 1953, 87 U.N.T.S. 103 [hereinafter "European
Convention"].
34. This concept had also been accepted by the drafters of the Geneva Conventions: Common
Article 3 made the right to a fair trial non-derogable. The content of this right has been described
at greater length in Protocol II.
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even during the gravest of emergencies.3 5 The derogation clause was in
addition to specific limitations clauses36 governing individual rights in
the Convention.
A similar approach was adopted in two other international instruments
which followed: the American Convention on Human Rights37 and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),3" al-
though the number of non-derogable rights in these documents varies
both from the European Convention and from each other.39 These
instruments also use slightly different phraseology to describe the crises
which would justify derogation: the American Convention opting for
"war, public danger, or other emergency that threatens the independence
or security of a State Party"40 and the ICCPR for "public emergency
which threatens the life of the nation.
' 41
All the three leading instruments prescribe, broadly speaking, seven
controls, two procedural and five substantive, on the use of emergency
powers. The procedural controls are: (a) a requirement that every state of
emergency must be formally declared by the government introducing it;
and (b) a further requirement that the.details of such emergency, as well
as the precise nature of any derogations involved, must be notified to a
prescribed authority. 42 On the substantive side, the treaties require that,
35. Supra note 33, Art. 15 (2). The non-derogable rights listed in this article are: right to life;
prohibition against torture orother inhuman treatment; prohibition against slavery or servitude;
and prohibition against retroactivity of criminal offences.
36. These clauses prescribed the broad heads under which many of the rights guaranteed by
the Convention could be subjected to formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties by
domestic law. Recognized grounds for such restrictions include: interests of national security,
territorial integrity, and public safety; prevention of disorder or crime; protection of health or
morals; protection of the reputation or rights of others; and maintenance of the authority and
impartiality of the judiciary.
37. 22 November 1969, in force 18 July 1978, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter "American
Convention"].
38. Adopted by the UN General Assembly 16 December 1966 (GA Res. 2200A, 1966, UN
Doc. A/6316) in force 23 March 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter "ICCPR"].
39. The American Convention lists the following eleven rights as non-derogable: fight to
juridical personality; right to life; fight to humane treatment; freedom from slavery; freedom
from ex postfacto laws; freedom of conscience and religion; rights of the family; fight to a
name; rights of the child; right to nationality; and right to participate in government [Art. 27(2)].
The ICCPR lists the following seven rights as non-derogable: right to life; prohibition against
torture or other inhumane treatment; prohibition against slavery and servitude; prohibition
against imprisonment for inability to fulfil a contractual obligation; prohibition against
retroactivity of criminal offences; right to recognition as a person; and freedom of thought,
conscience and religion [Art. 4(2)].
40. Supra note 37, Art. 27(1).
41. Supra note 38, Art. 4(1).
42. In the case of the European and American Conventions, this authority is the Secretary-
General of the Council of Europe and of the Organization of American States, respectively. In
the case of the ICCPR, it is the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
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for any state of emergency to be valid, the government concerned must
establish: (a) the existence of an exceptional threat to the security of the
state or of its people;4 3 (b) proportionality between the emergency
measures contemplated and the threat; (c) the absence of any discrimina-
tory feature in the emergency measures or procedures; (d) the compatibil-
ity of all derogation measures with the state's other international obliga-
tions; and (e) the complete insulation of certain 'core' rights, such as the
right to life, from derogation.
As important as the above mentioned standards are, their true worth
can only be gauged by the effectiveness of the mechanisms provided for
their enforcement. Here, a distinction has to be drawn between the two
regional instruments on the one hand, and the ICCPR on the other.
Whereas the European and American Conventions originally provided
for an adjudicatory mechanism in the form of a Commission" and a
Court45 (the European Commission was abolished in November 1999
under reforms which provided for a single-tier structure), the ICCPR
relies largely on a reporting system which is much less adversarial in
43. The phraseology in the three instruments has been the subject of some controversy:
whereas the European Convention and the ICCPR talk of a "public emergency threatening the
life of the nation" (Arts. 4 and 15, respectively), the American Convention talks of an
"emergency that threatens the independence or security of a State Party." The controversy has
centred around whether it is the state, the government, or the people of a state that should
legitimately be the subject of protection.
44. The European Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights, located in Strasbourg (France) and San Jos6 (Costa Rica), respectively. Both
these Commissions were empowered to receive complaints of violations of the Conventions
from states parties and from individuals living in any of the signatory countries [Art. 24, 25 of
the European Convention, Articles 44, 45 of the American Convention]. In the case of
individual complaints under the European Convention, and inter-state complaints under the
American Convention, they could only be entertained where the states parties concerned have
recognized the competence of the respective body to receive such complaints. The position
regarding the Inter-American Commission continues unchanged, while the European Com-
mission, as noted above, has now been abolished.
45. The European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights,
also situated in Strasbourg and San Jos6, respectively. Cases can only be referred to the Courts
by the respective Commissions or by states parties connected with a case before such
Commissions under each system [Art. 48 of the European Convention and Art. 61 of the
American Convention]. With the abolition of the European Commission, cases can now be
taken directly to the Court.
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character.46 In neither case do the bodies concerned have any direct
sanctions at their disposal; they can merely enter findings which are
communicated to the states parties concerned for suitable action.
47
A sufficient body ofjurisprudence has emerged in the past two or three
decades under these instruments, notably under the regional conventions,
to enable an assessment of their respective effectiveness in addressing the
human rights problems associated with states of emergency. Much of the
controversy has centred around the ability of the mechanisms to inquire
into and adjudicate upon two issues: (i) the genuineness of emergencies
claimed by governments as meeting the definitions laid down in the
respective instruments; and (ii) the need for particular measures derogat-
ing from the provisions of the instruments to counteract the actual threats
facing a state. The jurisprudence under the three instruments will be
reviewed individually before their effectiveness is evaluated.
II. Mechanisms of Human Rights Treaties
1. The European Convention
Taking the European Convention first, the Commission and the Court
have formally asserted their power to examine the factual legitimacy of
any emergency, but they have qualified this assertion by accepting that
46. Under this system, states parties are required to submit periodic reports to the Human
Rights Committee, a body of 18 independent experts, on how they have given effect to the
provisions of the Covenant within their territories. The Committee can, and usually does,
question representatives of states parties at public hearings on the content of their reports [Art.
40]. There are also provisions allowing for more adversarial-type proceedings, namely, inter-
state complaints (called "communications") concerning the implementation of the Covenant
[Art. 41 ], and complaints ("communications") by individuals concerning violations of rights
guaranteed by the Covenant [Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, 1966]. Both the latter provisions
are only applicable where a state-party has specifically recognized the competence of the
Human Rights Committee to receive such communications. The Human Rights Committee
does not, however, play ajudicial, or even quasi-judicial, role nor does it perform a fact finding
function in the way that the Inter-American Commission does.
47. Under the European system, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe had
been made responsible for execution of the findings of the Commission or the Court [Articles
32, 54] while under the American system, the Commission and the Court are empowered to
transmit their findings directly to the states parties. There is one further possibility under the
latter system: where a state party fails to implement the findings of the Commission within a
prescribed period, the Commission may, at the expiry of that period, decide to publish its report
(which is otherwise kept confidential between itself and the state party concerned)[Art. 51].
Under both systems, the respective Courts are empowered to grant just monetary satisfaction
to complainants [Art. 50, European Convention; Art. 68, American Convention]. The Ameri-
can Convention expressly provides that any order for compensatory damages may be executed
in the country concerned in accordance with domestic procedures for the execution of
judgments against the state [Art. 68]. The ultimate sanction available under either system,
should a state party wilfully fail to comply with such findings, is expulsion of the state-party
from the regional treaty body concerned.
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governments should enjoy a fairly wide margin of appreciation in
deciding whether an emergency meeting the requirements of Article 15
exists or not, and what powers are needed to deal with it.
48 In one case, 49
the Commission rejected the government's claim for an emergency
requiring a derogation from the Convention after making a fairly thor-
ough evaluation of the facts which were advanced in support of the claim,
but in other cases, it has accepted the government's assessment of the
situation. 0 It has defined 'public emergency' as:
an exceptional situation of crisis or emergency which affects the whole
population and constitutes a threat to the organised life of the community
of which the State is composed."'
As to the issue of whether particular measures resorted to by a state were
justified, even where the legitimacy of an emergency was not in doubt, the
European Court has laid down a number of tests, including, principally,
(i) whether ordinary law or action, otherwise compatible with the Con-
vention, was not enough to meet the demands of the emergency; 52 and (ii)
whether there was any proportionality between the measures contem-
plated and the needs of the emergency.53 Here, again, the Commission
and the Court have accepted that governments enjoy a margin of appre-
ciation in assessing the necessity for particular measures. In the Lawless
case, for example, the Commission refused to interfere with the Irish
government's assessment that detention without trial was more effica-
cious than trials before ordinary or special criminal courts,54 and in
Brannigan, it acceded to the British government's view that extended
48. Lawless v. Ireland (1961), 1 E.H.R.R. 15; Denmarkv. Greece (1969), 12 Y.B. Eur. Conv.
H.R. 45-76; Ireland v. United Kingdom (1976), Y.B. Eur. Conv. H.R. 1, at 512,2 E.H.R.R. 25;
In Ireland v. U.K., the Court thought that the national authorities were in a "better position" to
determine both the existence of an emergency and the nature and scope of the derogations
necessary to avert it. This approach mirrors the attitude evident in some of the Canadian and
American wartime cases: e.g. Fort Frances Pulp and Power [Paper] Co. v. Manitoba Free
Press Co., [ 1923] A.C. 695 at 706, where Lord Haldane ruled that "the Dominion Government
must be deemed to be left with considerable freedom to judge" as to what interest is to be
protected during an emergency; and Hamilton v. Kentucky Distillers & Warehouse Co., 251
U.S. 146 (1919) where Brandeis J. was of the opinion that "a wide latitude of discretion" must
be accorded to Congress in the exercise of the war power.
49. Denmark v. Greece, ibid.
50. E.g. Ireland v. U.K., ibid., Brannigan and McBride v. U.K., [1993] A 258-B Com. Rep.
In the latter case, even though the applicants accepted that there was a public emergency in
Northern Ireland, the Commission asserted its power to make its own assessment of the
situation, "albeit [a] limited [one]". It-and later the Court-affirmed the conclusion reached
by the applicants.
51. Lawless v. Ireland, supra note 48 at para. 28.
52. See, e.g., Brannigan and McBride v. U.K., supra note 50 at paras. 56-59.
53. See, e.g., De Becker v. Belgium (1961), 1 E.H.R.R. 43
54. Lawless v. Ireland, supra note 48 at paras. 35-36.
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detention without judicial supervision was necessary to successfully
investigate terrorist crimes." However, the Commission and the Court
have not always deferred to the governments' judgment in this area. In
Brogan v. United Kingdom56 for instance, the Court disagreed with the
British government's view that detention of terrorist suspects for up to
four days and six hours without judicial supervision was reasonable, in
circumstances where the government had not formally exercised its right
of derogation under Article 15 .51 More recently, in Aksoy v. Turkey,58 it
held that similar detention for up to 14 days was unacceptable, even
though the government had in this case entered the necessary deroga-
tion.
59
2. The American Convention
Turning next to the Inter-American mechanisms, one of the most striking
features of this system is that it has been infinitely more active in
monitoring and dealing with states of emergency than either its European
or UN counterpart. As well as assessing compliance by states parties to
the American Convention, the Inter-American Commission (IACHR)
has, for over three decades, undertaken on-site visits to, and special
studies of, countries with a state of emergency.60 The on-site visits have
been particularly noted for their boldness: they have resulted in secret
detention cells being unearthed, 61 corpses of human rights victims being
exhumed from clandestine graves, 62 and safe passage being provided for
55. Brannigan and McBride v. U.K., supra note 50. The majority of the Commission argued
that "it is not the Commission's function to substitute its view for the Government's assessment
of what might be the most prudent or expedient policy to combat terrorism" (para 60).
56. (1988), 11 E.H.R.R. 117.
57. Ibid. at 135-36 (para. 62).
58. (1996), 23 E.H.R.R. 553.
59. Ibid., para. 66. In this case, the Court took particularly serious note of the fact that
insufficient safeguards were provided to the detainee: "[T]he denial of access to a lawyer, doctor,
relative or friend and the absence of any realistic possibility of being brought before a court to test
the legality of the detention meant that he was left completely at the mercy of those holding him"
(para. 83). The Court distinguished Brannigan and McBride on this point (para. 82).
60. These studies have been carried out under Art. 18(c) of the Statute of the Inter-American
Commission for Human Rights (IACHR) which authorizes it to "prepare such studies or
reports as it considers advisable for the performance of its duties." The reports can be prepared
either on its own initiative, on a request from another organ of the Organization of American
States (OAS), at the suggestion of a non-governmental organization, or at the invitation of a
government.
61. In El Salvador (1978), see Report on the Situation of Human Rights in El Salvador, OEA/
Ser.L/V/II.46, doc. 23, rev. 1 at 19-20.
62. In Guatemala (1981), see Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Republic of
Guatemala, OEA/Ser.LIV/II.53, doc. 21, rev. 2 at 37.
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hostage takers. 63 For an inter-governmental body, the IACHR has also
been unusually vocal in rejecting the argument, often advanced by
governments, that terrorism justifies extreme responses from state agen-
cies.' More controversially, it has consistently refused to formally
examine or condemn human rights violations by non-governmental
actors such as terrorists.
On the adjudicatory side, the record of the IACHR is a mixed one. It
has shown a marked reluctance to deal expeditiously with complaints of
human rights violations, with the result that its caselaw is less profuse
than that of its European counterpart. However, it has produced some
bold decisions, including two where it denounced laws passed by Argen-
tina and Uruguay granting amnesty to their respective military and police
forces for emergency related human rights abuses.65 It has also been very
innovative in the use to which it has put complaints: they have resulted
in on-site investigatory visits66 and special reports. 67 The IACHR has an
advantage over its European counterpart in that, while adjudicating
complaints, it can draw adverse inferences against a respondent govern-
ment that fails to rebut the allegations in the complaint within a reason-
able period of time.
68
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has demonstrated an
equally bold approach on matters concerning states of emergency.
Despite a paucity of judgments on the subject from this body, there have
been at least two Advisory Opinions69 of crucial importance. These have
held that the remedies of habeas corpus and amparo are among the
63. In Colombia (1981), see Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Republic of
Colombia (1981), OEA/Ser.LIVfl.53, doc. 22 at 12-15.
64. The organization has countered this argument by asserting that only governments lacking
broad popular support will rely on state terrorism, while those enjoying such support will strive
to maintain the rule of law even in the face of terrorism; see, e.g., Report on the Situation of
Human Rights in Argentina, OEA/Ser.LV/II.49, doc. 19, corr. 1, at 25-27 (1980) and Annual
Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 1990-1991, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.79
doc. 12, rev. 1 (1991) at 504-5..
65. Report No. 28/92 of 2 October 1992 (Argentina) (1992), 13 H.R.L.J. 336; and Report No.
29/92 of 2 October 1992 (Uruguay) (1992), 13 H.R.L.J. 340.
66. See, e.g., Report No. 6/91, Case 10.400, IACHR Annual Report 1990-1991, supra note
64 at 193-233.
67. See, e.g., Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Guatemala (1981), supra note 62.
68. Art. 42, American Convention. The Commission used this power, for example, to make
a presumption that allegations contained in fifty cases of 'disappearances' in Peru were true,
after the Peruvian government failed to respond despite several requests from the Commission;
see Annual Report 1990-1991, supra note 64 at 251-422.
69. Under Art. 64 of the American Convention, the Inter-American Court is empowered to
give Advisory Opinions on "the interpretation of this Convention or of other treaties
concerning the protection of human rights in the American states." Such opinions may be
sought by any member state of the OAS on both abstract questions and questions relating to
specific situations.
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judicial guarantees which may never be suspended during an emergency.
The Court underlined the importance of these non-derogable guarantees
by asserting that their denial would violate the principle of separation of
powers inherent in the concept of the rule of law.7" The Court has also
been commended by human rights monitors for its procedural ingenuity
and boldness. In several cases it has sought and obtained extensive
witness testimony, including circumstantial evidence, where the appli-
cants concerned were unable to supply any such testimony.71 Also, it has
not shirked from passing effective interim orders where necessary, for
example, to prevent the intimidation of witnesses.
7 2
3. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
Turning, finally, to the United Nations system, it is necessary to look at
the work of: (i) the Human Rights Committee, the main treaty based body
charged with implementing the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights; and (ii) two non-treaty based entities, the Commission
on Human Rights and the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimi-
nation and Protection of Minorities, which are also concerned with
monitoring states of emergency. Reference will also be made to some of
the other mechanisms within the United Nations system, such as the
procedures of the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO),
and the Committee Against Torture, all of which concern themselves,
albeit indirectly, with one or more aspects of human rights protection
during emergencies.
The principal mechanism through which emergency regimes are
formally monitored by the Human Rights Committee is the periodic
report review process under Article 40 of the ICCPR. Under this process,
which usually takes place at five yearly intervals,73 all states parties are
required to submit a report describing the progress of their implementa-
tion of the Covenant, including derogations if any under Article 4, and the
Committee is entitled to question government representatives on their
70. Advisory Opinions OC-8/87 and OC-9/87 of 6 October 1987,Annual Report of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights 1988, OEA/Ser.L/VI/III. 19, doc. 13.
71. See, e.g., the Veldsquez Rodriguez case (1988), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Set. C) No. 4;
Godinez Cruz case (1989), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Set C) No. 5; Fairen Garbi & Solis Corrales
case (1989), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Set C) No. 6.
72. See, e.g., Godinez Cruz, ibid. at paras. 41-52.
73. The first review takes place at the end of one year after a country has ratified or acceded
to the ICCPR. Thereafter, states parties are required to submit reports "whenever the [Human
Rights] Committee so requests" (Art. 40, ICCPR). The Committee has designated a five-year
cycle for second and subsequent reports. In practice, many states parties have defaulted on
submission of periodic reports, sometimes by as many as three or more years, so that the cycle
is not closely adhered to.
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content in public hearings. The Committee is also empowered to make
general comments on such reports,74 and to receive inter-state com-
plaints75 as well as 'communications' from individuals alleging viola-
tions of the Covenant by states.76
The record of the report review process is mixed. As well as suffering
from the problem of resource constraints to which the entire United
Nations system has been prone for several years now, and which tends
significantly to hamstring the Committee's research capacities, the
Committee has sometimes been viewed as less than demanding in its
questioning of governments. As Fitzpatrick has noted, for example,
"states that have not been the focus of NGO activism, that have not been
the subject of other international procedures, that file a brief and abstract
report and/or send a low-level representative to the Committee's meet-
ings may escape from the report review essentially unscathed, without the
true picture of their human rights situation emerging. '77 The problem has
been compounded by a deliberate decision by the Committee, during its
drafting of guidelines for the submission of periodic reports, to leave out
information concerning derogations78; this has provided an excuse for
states parties frequently to maintain a studied silence on this vital point.
Examples of countries which have escaped lightly as a result of soft
treatment by the Committee include: Tunisia, which in its 1987 periodic
report, merely made a bald assertion that its emergency measures,
initiated in 1984, were "more symbolic than real" 79; Zambia, which in its
first periodic report, reviewed in 1987, did not even mention that an
emergency, declared on extremely flimsy grounds several years before,
was still in force, let alone provide any justification for it"° ; and Iraq,
which made the astounding claim that, despite its long and bitter war with
74. Art. 40(4).
75. Art. 41. This provision, which requires states parties to make a specific declaration
recognizing the competence of the Committee to receive such complaints, has never been used
so far.
76. Optional Protocol to the ICCPR. Such complaints can only be entertained if the state party
alleged to be guilty of the violations, has recognized the competence of the Committee to
receive such "communications" (Art. 1).
77. Fitzpatrick, Human Rights in Crisis, supra note 17 at 87.
78. The decision was prompted by a fear on the part of some members that, if a specific
reference was made to derogations, it might lead to a weakening of the notification requirement
under Art. 4(3) of the ICCPR: see UN Doc. A/32/44, para. 138. Unfortunately, this view seems
to have prevailed even when the Committee issued its revised guidelines for periodic reports
in 1991: see Annex VII to Report of the Human Rights Committee, UN Doc. A/46/40 (1991).
79. Report of the Human Rights Committee (1987), UN Doc. A/42/40, paras. 105-148.
80. This emergency, in force since Zambia's independence from British rule in 1964, had
been proclaimed on grounds of the country's involvement in liberation struggles in South
Africa, refugee problems, tribal divisions and economic stress. See UN Doc. CCPR/C/SR.771
(1987).
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Iran, it did not consider an emergency to be in existence. The Iraqi
government, furthermore, claimed that, far from imposing any curbs on
the rights of its people during that war, it was able to expand their
enjoyment of human rights-a claim which went virtually unchal-
lenged.8
The Committee has, however, sometimes departed from this timid
approach and shown a willingness to subject governmental representa-
tives to searching questions. Its treatment of the Chilean and Argentinean
periodic reports in the early 1980s and 1990s offers good examples of
robustness. In the case of Chile, the Committee took the unusual step of
characterizing the government's initial report, submitted in 1979, as
insufficiently detailed and asked for additional information. When this
information was submitted in 1984,82 the Committee found it still far
from satisfactory. After a close scrutiny of this second report, the majority
of Committee members expressed the opinion that the emergency pro-
claimed by the government could not be justified under Article 4. "[W]hat
was called an emergency in Chile," they said, "had nothing to do with
what was intended by the same term in article 4."83 The Committee also
strongly deplored the Chilean government's failure to send a proper
derogation notice to the Secretary-General .8 4 In the case of Argentina, the
Committee grilled the government's representative on a wide range of
issues including the failure of the Argentinean constitution to guarantee
the non-derogable rights listed in Article 4, the possibility of a state of
emergency being declared on flimsy grounds such as the fear of internal
disturbances, and the constitutional propriety .of a state of siege being
imposed after the country had returned to civilian rule.85
The Committee's willingness to adopt a tougher line appears to have
become more marked in recent years. In 1989, it sharply criticized
Cameroon for failing to comply with the strict standards laid down in
Article 4 for derogations.86 In 1990, it rejected the Yemeni government's
argument that the problem of economic underdevelopment justified the
81. HRC Report, 1987, supra note 79 at para. 197.
82. As part of Chile's second periodic report which had by then become due under the five-
year rule.
83. Report of the Human Rights Committee 1984, UN Doc. A/39/40, at 83, para. 449. They
found no merit in the government's claim that the existence of terrorist activities, coupled with
the adverse effects of the world economic situation at the time, justified the emergency.
84. Ibid. at 78 para. 437.
85. UN Doc. CCPR/C/SR.952 (1990), paras. 11, 13, 14, 16, 22, 31 and 36.
86. Report of the Human Rights Committee 1989, UN Doc. A/44/40 Annex VII, at para. 461.
Cameroon was criticized again in 1994 for failing to "notify in the correct manner" the
proclamation of a state of emergency in the country's north west province two years earlier;
see UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add. 33, para. 7.
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declaration of a state of emergency.87 In 1992, the Committee found the
emergency provisions in the Ecuadorian Constitution to be far too
broadly worded so that it allowed the government to declare a state of
emergency merely in response to, for example, labour unrest.88 In 1993,
the Committee questioned Ireland's continued resort to emergency
powers since 1976 without sufficientjustification. 9 In 1991, it expressed
strong reservations over India's use of anti-terrorist legislation which did
not comply with the Covenant's provisions, and over the Indian
government's failure to enter appropriate derogations in respect of other
measures taken to deal with secessionist violence in different parts of the
country. 90
In 1995, the Committee urged the British Government to reconsider
the need for the derogation notice filed by it in relation to the emergency
in Northern Ireland, in light of the "significant decline in terrorist
violence" that followed the recent 'peace process' there. 9' The same year,
the Committee expressed concern over many of the emergency laws and
regulations enacted in Sri Lanka which, it felt, "may not be in full
compliance with the requirement of the provisions of article 4 [of the
ICCPR]." The Committee was also concerned that courts in Sri Lanka
"do not have the power to examine the legality of the declaration of
emergency and of the different measures taken during the state of
emergency." 92 In 1996, the Committee criticized Zambia for the lack of
clarity in that country's legal provisions governing the introduction and
administration of a state of emergency, and noted with concern that the
derogation of rights allowed under the Zambian Constitution went far
beyond what is permissible under the ICCPR.93 It used even stronger
language to condemn the military government of Nigeria for a wide range
of laws and practices which were, in its opinion, clearly incompatible
with the provisions of the ICCPR. It deplored the Nigerian government's
argument that some of the impugned laws were unassailable because they
pre-dated the entry into force of the Covenant in Nigeria. "The Cov-
enant," said the Committee, "precluded measures derogating from the
87. Report of the Human Rights Committee 1990, UN Doc. A/45/50 Annex VIII at para. 70.
88. Sixteenth Annual Report ofthe Human Rights Committee, UN Doc. CCPR/ Il/Add. 1,297
at para. 225.
89. Comments of the Human Rights Committee, UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add. 21, paras. 11-12.
90. UN Docs. CCPR/C/SR. 1039-1042, 26-27 March 1991.
91. UN Doc. A/50/40, paras. 427-428.
92. UN Doc. A/50/40, para. 448. Similar concern was expressed in respect of Bolivia where
recent proposals for constitutional reform included a move to remove the powers of the
Constitutional Court to review the declaration of a state of emergency; see UN Doc. CCPR/C/
79/Add. 76 at para. 23.
93. UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add. 62 at para. 11.
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State party's obligations other than in the limited circumstances provided
for by article 4 which have not been applied in the case of Nigeria.
94
The Committee has also expressed strong concerns over the practice
of a government attaching reservations to its acceptance of the derogation
provision itself, holding that this constituted "a serious inconsistency
with the objectives and purposes of treaty law."95 However, the fact that
the Committee has not expressly ruled such reservations to be invalid
96
has been seen as a lacuna in its jurisprudence. 97 Fortunately, the lacuna
has since been addressed, to some extent, by a General Comment adopted
in 1994.98 The only other General Comment on Article 4, adopted in
1981,99 has been criticized for providing "little in the way of detailed and
nuanced substantive interpretation"'00 of the article.'0'
Even the more adjudicatory role available to the Committee under the
inter-state and individual complaints procedures'02 has been seen to have
had only a marginal impact on the protection of human rights during
states of emergency. The inter-state complaints procedure has never been
used so far, despite the fact that 45 countries, as of May 15, 1997, have
recognized the competence of the Committee to entertain such com-
plaints. As for individual complaints, 911 'communications' had been
received by January 27, 2000-from 63 of the 95 countries which have
so far acceded to or ratified the Optional Protocol-but the Committee,
94. UN Doc. A/51/40 at para. 278.
95. UN Doc. CCPR/C/SR.555, para. 1, in relation to Trinidad and Tobago, which had made
such a reservation. This reservation prompted formal objections from other states parties such
as the Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands, who believed that it was incompatible
with the object and purpose of the Covenant.
96. In the case of Trinidad and Tobago, the Committee merely asked the government to
consider withdrawing the reservation.
97. See, e.g., D. McGoldrick, The Human Rights Committee: Its Role in the Development of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991) at
306-7.
98. General Comment No. 24/52 adopted on 2 November 1994, UN Doc. E/1995/49 (1995)
4 at para. 10. In this Comment, the Committee opined that "[a] reservation to the provisions
of article 4 itself, which precisely stipulates the balance to be struck between the interests of
the State and the rights of the individual in times of emergency" would offend against the
"object and purpose" test laid down in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
99. General Comment No. 5/13, UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (1994) 5-6. This Comment
laments the tendency of states-parties to provide but the barest of legal information in their
periodic reports, e.g., about the mechanisms available for the declaration of a state of
emergency, without describing the actual measures used. It also reiterates the well known
principles of notification, proportionality and non-discrimination inherent in Art. 4.
100. Fitzpatrick, Human Rights in Crisis, supra note 17 at 96.
101. The need for a new General Comment, incorporating the Committee's jurisprudence
over the past decade and a half, was highlighted by the UN Special Rapporteur on States of
Emergency in his 1995 report; UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1995/20, 12 at paras. 31, 32.
102. Art. 41 and the Optional Protocol (1976), respectively.
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although it has shown some procedural boldness, does not appear to have
succeeded in generating sufficiently hard hitting case law.13
The Committee has, for instance, formally asserted its power to review
the legitimacy of an emergency declaration in one case, 'I but shirked
from using that power in practice, on the rather unconvincing grounds
that the respondent government failed to supply the information neces-
sary to make such a determination. 15 The Committee has likewise
avoided deciding the legality of derogations: in a Colombian case decided
in 1982, for example, it merely lamented that the government had not
provided "a sufficiently detailed account of the relevant facts to show that
[a] situation of the kind described in Article 4(1) of the Covenant
exists."'" 6
It has, however, shown greater robustness in some of its procedural
rulings, holding, for instance, that, where a government had merely
responded with vague and general denials of allegations against it, the
Committee was entitled to draw an inference of culpability, 0 7 and that the
burden of proving or disproving allegations had, in some cases, to be
shared between the complainant and the respondent state.'018 The Com-
mittee has also held that it had the right to communicate directly with
victims of human rights abuses who were deprived of their liberty. '9
4. Other Treaty Based Mechanisms
Other treaty based mechanisms which are concerned, albeit indirectly,
with addressing human rights problems during states of emergency
include the procedures of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) 11
103. Of these 911 communications, the Committee adopted 'views' in 333: 256 of them
disclosed a violation of one or more provisions of the ICCPR and 77 did not; see online: <http./
/www.unhchr.chihtml/menu2/8/stat2.htm> (updated 27 January 2000).
104. Landinelli Silva v. Uruguay: Communication No. 34 of 1978 (decided on 8 April 1981),
Selected Decisions under the Optional Protocol, UN Doc. CCPR/C/OP/I (1985).
105. Ibid. at para 8.3.
106. Salgar de Montejo v. Colombia: Communication No. 64 of 1979 (decided on 24 March
1982), Selected Decisions, supra note 104 at para. 10.3.
107. E.g., Valcada v. Uruguay: Communication No. 9 of 1977 (decided on 26 October 1979),
Selected Decisions, supra note 104 at para. 11.
108. E.g., Bleir v. Uruguay: Communication No. 30 of 1978, Selected Decisions, supra note
104 at para. 13.3.
109. E.g., Setelich v. Uruguay: Comunication No. 63 of 1979 (decided on 28 October 1981),
Selected Decisions, supra note 104 at para. 18.
110. These procedures comprise: (1) a convention based system which relies on periodic
reporting by states-parties; (2) a convention based complaints procedure and a representations
procedure; and (3) a special complaints procedure, available to governments, employers'
organizations and workers' organizations, regardless of whether the accused state has or has
not ratified the relevant convention.
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and the UN sponsored Committee Against Torture (CAT). Despite its
focus on freedom of association and workers' rights, the ILO has made
a significant contribution to the legal control of emergency regimes over
the years. Time and again, it has reiterated the principle that:
If a plea of emergency is to be treated in international law as a legal concept
there ... has to be appraisal by an impartial authority at the international
level. It is for this reason that international tribunals and supervisory
organs, when seized of such a plea, have invariably made an independent
determination of whether the circumstances justified the claim, and have
not allowed the state concerned to be the sole judge of the issue. II
The organization has also buttressed other principles governing states of
emergency by holding that:
as regards the enjoyment of civil liberties which are essential for the
effective exercise of trade union rights, the plea of a state of emergency to
justify the restriction of these liberties should only be involved in circum-
stances of extreme gravity constituting a case offorce majeure and subject
to the condition that any measures affecting in any way the guarantees
established in the Conventions should be limited both in extent and in time
to what is strictly necessary to deal with the particular situation.
1 2
The ILO has an effective system for gathering information on human
rights practices around the world, including a well developed programme
of on-site visits, which could be a useful supplement to other international
efforts at monitoring human rights violations during states of emergency.
As for the Committee Against Torture (CAT), it too can provide a
valuable input into the monitoring process through its reports on torture
and other inhuman and degrading practices which are usually widespread
during periods of emergency. Like the Human Rights Committee, the
CAT functions primarily through a system of periodic reporting by states
parties, and a voluntary individual 'communications' procedure, but it
also has access to information from other sources, and is noted for greater
forthrightness in its reports than some of the other UN sponsored
111. ILO Official Bulletin, No. 2 (1971) 111-112 at paras. 108-109.
112. Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommen-
dations, 69th Session of the International Labour Conference, 1983, Vol. B, Report III (Part
4B) para. 72.
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bodies. 13 Up until February 3, 2000, the Committee had registered 154
individual 'communications'-from 19 of the 41 countries that have
recognized its competence to deal with such complaints-and adopted
'views' in 38 of them. 14
5. Effectiveness of the Mechanisms of Human Rights Treaties
To sum up, it would be fair to say that, while each of the three treaty based
systems has its own peculiar strengths and weaknesses, the regional
mechanisms seem to be more effective than the ICCPR based system.
Between the two regional mechanisms, the Inter-American system ap-
pears to have some advantages over its European counterpart. The Inter-
American Commission has, for instance, shown a willingness to judge
state conduct during emergencies by the standards of the American
Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man and of customary interna-
tional law even where the government concerned may not have ratified
the American Convention. The Inter-American Commission has also
demonstrated a high degree of procedural ingenuity by undertaking on-
site visits to countries with serious human rights problems, and through
its practice of publishing special reports on emergency regimes, either on
its own initiative or on the request of other organs of the Organization of
American States, governments or even non-governmental organizations.
No less significantly, the Inter-American Commission has been remark-
ably more forthright in its assessment-and condemnation-of human
rights practices of its member states than either the European Commis-
sion or the U.N. Human Rights Committee. On the other hand, its case law
has been less prolific than that of the European Commission. Ironically,
the limited success of the Inter-American system has, in recent years, led
to calls from some of its member states for changes to its rules of
functioning which would,-in the view of human rights activists, weaken
113. In 1990, for instance, it criticized the Chilean government for not providing a satisfac-
tory level of anti-torture training to its public officials despite previous undertakings to do so;
see Report of the Committee Against Torture, UN Doc. A/47/44 (1990) at para. 375. The
Committee has also condemned as "incompatible with the spirit and purpose of the [Torture]
Convention" an Argentinean law which deprived torture victims of remedies for abuses which
occurred during that country's state of siege, although, for legal reasons, it was unable to
entertain the complaints in question; ibid. at paras. 549-550.
114. Of these 38 cases, 18 disclosed a violation of the treaty and 20 did not; see online: <http./
Avww.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/8/stat3.htm> (updated Feb. 3, 2000).
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even more the capacity of the Inter-American Commission and Court to
tackle abuses."5
As for the Human Rights Committee, it has been seen to be the weakest
of the three mechanisms, not least because of: the problems inherent in
the large number and wide diversity of states comprising the system; the
paucity of its resources; the absence of permanent institutional structures
such as a Commission or a Court; the inadequacy of its fact-finding
capabilities; a general reluctance on the part of members to take on a more
activist role in monitoring human rights performance of individual
governments; and the absence of an authority to follow up recommenda-
tions and enforce compliance. Despite these shortcomings, it has never-
theless performed a useful role in highlighting state practices during
emergencies, even if its success in bringing governments to account for
human rights abuses has been rather modest.
III. Non-Treaty Based Mechanisms
There are two main non-treaty based intergovernmental bodies con-
cerned with states of emergency: the Commission on Human Rights"
16
and the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection
of Minorities.' 7 Both are organs of the United Nations, and are based in
Geneva. Between them, there are several mechanisms and procedures
relevant to human rights protection during states of emergency, of which
two are most directly and specifically concerned with the subject: (i) the
confidential procedure for the examination of situations which reveal "a
consistent pattern of gross and reliably attested violations of human rights
and fundamental freedoms," commonly called "the 1503 Procedure";" 8
and (ii) the Special Rapporteur on the Question of Human Rights and
115. Among the changes proposed, notably by Mexico and Peru, are: that NGOs should not
be allowed to bring cases to the Inter-American Commission or Court; that the confidentiality
of reports and recommendations of the Commission should be preserved even when govern-
ments fail to respect them; that the Commission should not be allowed to undertake on-site
investigatory visits; that the power of the Court, in exceptional circumstances, to waive the
general rule requiring all complainants to exhaust domestic remedies be removed; and that the
right to bring complaints of violations be restricted to citizens only; see, e.g. Katherine
Sainsbury, "Proposed Changes Threaten Inter-American Human Rights System" (1997) 4 H.
R. Trib. 13.
116. Hereinafter "the Commission."
117. Hereinafter "the Sub-Commission."
118. After the resolution under which it was created: Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)
Resolution 1503 of 1970, UN Doc. E/4832/Add.l at para. 8. This procedure grew out of a
previous resolution, No. 1235 of 1967, UN Doc.E/4393, which authorized the Commission to
make a "thorough study" and to report on situations of violations of human rights. The latter
resolution did not, however, provide any mechanism for resolving the problems presented by
such situations; it merely allowed the Commission to debate them.
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States of Emergency."19 For the purposes of this study, the work of these
two mechanisms is particularly relevant. 20
1. The 1503 Procedure
Under the 1503 Procedure, the United Nations has a mandate to entertain
"communications" from anyone, including non-governmental organiza-
tions and other groups, concerning violations by any state 2' of any
human right 22 of which the author has "direct and reliable knowledge."
These communications are put through a multi-stage filtration process,
beginning with the UN Secretariat and ending with the Commission on
Human Rights. The procedure has been described as a "petition informa-
tion system" and contrasted with a "petitioner recourse system" such as
under the Optional Protocol or under any of the regional human rights
conventions,'23 because the communications under the 1503 Procedure
are treated simply as sources of information rather than as complaints. 1
24
At the end of the process, the Commission might decide between several
choices of action: (a) it may discontinue consideration of the case, either
because the case does not reveal "a consistent pattern of gross viola-
tions," 12 5 or because it has not met the Commission's admissibility
119. Appointed pursuant to ECOSOC Resolution 1985/35. Hereinafter "Special Rapporteur
on States of Emergency."
120. Another mechanism which also deals with countries having significant human rights
problems (including those under a state of emergency) is the 1235 procedure (supra note 118),
under which there are public debates during sessions of the Commission and Sub-Commission
every year. Outside the United Nations system, a major non-treaty based inter-governmental
body which also concerns itself, albeit only peripherally and less visibly, with human rights
matters globally is the European Parliament. That parliament has, over the years, passed
resolutions expressing concern over the human rights situation in many countries experiencing
formal or defacto states of emergency, including Burma, Indonesia/East Timor and Colombia.
Another inter-governmental body which has similarly taken note of situations of gross and
systematic human rights violations is the Commonwealth, a 54 member strong voluntary
association of former British colonies. In 1995, it took the unprecedented step of suspending
Nigeria from the organization for two years to register its strong disapproval of the human
rights situation in that country.
121. Including those that are not members of the United Nations. Furthermore, the author of
a communication need not have any connection with the state complained against.
122. Including those that are not provided for in any of the international instruments.
123. See, e.g., M.E. Tardu, "United Nations Response to Gross Violations of Human Rights:
the 1503 Procedure" (1980) 20 Santa Clara L. Rev. 559 at 561.
124. Indeed, one of the criticisms that has often been made of the procedure is that it treats
authors of communications less favourably than it does respondent states, because at no stage
of the process is the author kept informed of the fate of his or her communication, whereas
governments are given multiple opportunities to respond as the communication progresses
through the system.
125. E.g., the case against Zaire, which was "dropped" in 1991. This decision was criticized
by many human rights monitors as they believed that there was evidence of "continuing human
rights violations" in that country. Other cases similarly dropped include Burma (1979), Gabon
(1986), Malaysia (1984), Pakistan (1984, 1985) and Venezuela (1982).
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requirements, or because there has been a real and significant improve-
ment in the human rights situation in the country concerned;'26 (b) it may
propose that the case be sent for consideration under another, more
appropriate, procedure;'27 (c) it may simply defer a decision on the case
pending receipt of further information or clarification from the govern-
ment; (d) it may designate a person to make direct contacts with the
government;'28 (e) it may decide to undertake a "thorough study" of the
situation described in the case;'29 or (f) it may decide to appoint an adhoc
committee to investigate the situation. 3° The "thorough study" or inves-
tigation so ordered is usually carried out in private and any resultant
report kept confidential.' 3' The Commission has also, on occasion, asked
the UN Secretary-General to establish direct contacts with the govern-
ment concerned'32 -a practice which has been used at the instance of
other plenary bodies. In 1996, for example, the General Assembly
requested the Secretary-General to use his good offices to undertake
discussions with the Nigerian government following an escalation of
international concern over the human rights practices of the military
regime of General Sane Abacha.133
126. E.g., Argentina in 1984, when it reverted to democratic government after the end of the
long state of siege.
127. E.g., the case against Equatorial Guinea in 1979, where the Commission decided that it
would be more appropriate to have it taken up in public meetings under Resolution 1235, supra
note 118. This resolution authorizes the Commission and the Sub-Commission to consider
each year "the question of violation of human rights" and forms the basis for a wide-ranging
public discussion on the subject, without any geographic or thematic restrictions. Such public
discussions have, however, often been characterized by political manoeuvring and gross
selectivity which have diminished their credibility.
128. E.g., in the case of Burma, where a Special Rapporteur was asked to initiate such contacts
and report to the Commission in confidential session. When this process failed to produce any
appreciable results, following lack of co-operation from the Burmese government, the
Commission decided to appoint a Special Rapporteur under the public procedure in 1992.
129. E.g., in the case of Afghanistan in 1984, though in this case the recommendation was to
undertake an "ad hoc study" of its human rights situation; UN Doc. E/CN.4/SR.63, at para. 1.
Two other countries in respect of which "thorough studies" were ordered were Equatorial
Guinea and Uganda.
130. The difference between an "investigation" and a "thorough study" is that the latter can
be carried out without the consent of the respondent government but the former requires its
consent. Also, an investigation can be ordered only if "all available means at the national level
have been resorted to and exhausted" and if the subject matter of the case is not already being
dealt with under any other UN, regional or other international procedure.
131. There has been a progressive dilution of the secrecy rule surrounding the 1503 Procedure
since 1978 when, for the first time, the Commission announced the names of countries on which
'decisions' had been reached. The practice has been followed regularly ever since.
132. E.g., in the case of Uruguay.
133. An example of the use of the good offices technique by the Commission is to be found
in the case of East Timor; see Commission Resolution 1997/63 dated 16 April 1997.
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As with other UN mechanisms, the record of the 1503 Procedure has
been a mixed one. To the extent that it allows a spotlight to be turned on
emergency regimes globally, 34 the procedure is a valuable tool for their
study. It is also helpful in that it "represents the first recognition by the
human rights community that monitoring and enforcement activity
should be concentrated on situations in which the scale and intensity of
alleged violations is the primary basis for [international] intervention." 3 5
Other virtues of the procedure include its potential for bringing before the
Commission and Sub-Commission situations in countries which are not
always in the public eye, 3 6 and the incentive it offers to engage govern-
ments in constructive dialogue:
Everything which induces a government to co-operate is particularly
important because the efficacity [sic] of United Nations procedures in the
field of human rights depends, to a large extent, on the measure of dialogue
which can be established between the United Nations and the government
of the country concerned .... By expressing regrets when communications
are kept pending-particularly when this happens at the level of the Sub-
Commission-instead of being forwarded to the superior organ, human
rights friends overlook the point that there is no real solution to the problem
at the end of the procedure. The succession of steps composing the
procedure is more influential than the actual step itself.'37
134. Most of the countries examined under the 1503 Procedure so far have been under a
formal or de facto state of emergency: e.g., Albania, Haiti, Indonesia, Republic of Korea,
Pakistan, Paraguay, Turkey, Uganda and Uruguay. At its 1997 session, the Commission on
Human Rights decided to keep the following five countries under consideration under this
procedure: Chad, Gambia, Kyrgyzstan, Saudi Arabia and Sierra Leone. Only rarely have
countries which cannot by any objective standards be said to be under a state of emergency been
drawn into this procedure, a prominent recent example being the United States of America,
which had been under consideration briefly in 1997, apparently following complaints relating
to aspects of that country's criminal justice system.
135. Hadden et al., supra note 28.
136. See M.J. Bossuyt, "The Development of Special Procedures of the United Nations
Commission on Human Rights" (1985) 6 H.R.L.J. 179 at 184.
137. Ibid. at 183-184.
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But its usefulness is reduced by a number of factors, notably its excessive
secretiveness 3 ' and the scope for political manipulation.'39 A particu-
larly worrying example under the latter category is the practice whereby
officials from respondent governments are allowed to participate in either
the screening' 4° or consideration 4' of communications against their own
governments. Besides, the investigatory and redressal roles of the mecha-
nism are very limited, and the process is unduly dilatory. Prominent
examples of defacto emergency situations where the mechanism failed
to check egregious violations of human rights include Uganda4 2 and
Argentina 43 in the 1970s and 1980s, and Iraq, Somalia and Zaire in the
1990s. The procedure has caused such deep disappointment among some
observers that one of them characterized it as "truly dangerous to human
rights-and [one which] offers a useful refuge to repressive regimes.' 44
Another commentator less scathingly suggested that the procedure "would
seem to have outlived whatever usefulness it might have had in the 1960s
and 1970s."' 4 In any case, the procedure has been seen to be inappropri-
138. Critics have wondered, for instance, as to why the Sub-Commission cannot publish the
names of countries that it has decided to forward to the Commission, especially since the
Commission has broken the rule of secrecy, ibid. at 183.
139. A telling example of such manipulation is the manner in which the government of
Argentina first successfully blocked the use of this procedure to deal with complaints
concerning gross human rights abuses within its territory for some time, and later-when this
tactic failed-used it as an excuse to stifle any public debate about such abuses within other
UN bodies; see Howard Tolley, "The Concealed Crack in the Citadel: the United Nations
Commission on Human Rights' Response to Confidential Communications" (1984) 6 Hum.
Rts. Q., 420 at 440-446.
140. This happens where such officials sit as "independent experts" in the Sub-Commission,
after being elected to that body.
141. This happens where such officials sit as members of the Commission, after being
nominated by their governments.
142. In this case, brought within the procedure's process in 1974, there was overwhelming
evidence that Idi Amin, the country's President, had killed tens of thousands of people since
1970, but it was only as late as 1978 that the Commission decided to act, choosing to send an
envoy to meet the President. By then it was too late, and in any case, Amin had been overthrown.
143. Here, the first attempt to activate the procedure, in 1977, failed at the initial hurdle of the
Working Group of the Sub-Commission. By the time this hurdle was crossed a year later, the
human rights situation had worsened so rapidly that the Commission was compelled to discuss
it in its public procedure in 1979-a full year before the case had been accepted under the 1503
procedure. By then, considerable damage had been done, with hundreds of thousands of people
having been subjected to disappearances by the ruling military regime. For a comprehensive
account of this case see lain Guest, Behind the Disappearances: Argentina's Dirty Waragainst
Human Rights and the United Nations (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvia Press, 1990).
144. Ibid. at 441.
145. P. Alston, "The Commission on Human Rights" in P. Alston, ed., The United Nations
and Human Rights: A Critical Appraisal (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992) 126 at 155.
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ate "[i]f the objective is to obtain prompt publicity or public action for
serious human rights violations"146
2. Special Rapporteur on States of Emergency
A more formal mechanism for the study and control of emergency
regimes is to be found in the institution of the Special Rapporteur on
States of Emergency, created by the Sub-Commission following that
body's pioneering 1982 study on the subject. 147 The mandate of the
Special Rapporteur is essentially to prepare, on an annual basis, a list of
countries that have proclaimed, extended or terminated a state of emer-
gency since 1 January 1985 and to monitor their compliance with the
domestic and international norms governing the subject. Despite suffer-
ing from the resource constraints that are endemic in the UN system,
48
the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Leandro Despouy, was able to make some
impressive strides during the decade and a half that he was in office. His
first three annual reports reflected a cautious approach, listing only states
that had experienced formally declared emergencies, but beginning with
his fourth report, the Special Rapporteur showed a willingness to include
defacto emergencies 49 as well. He also attempted to examine some of the
146. Frank Newman and David Weissbrodt, International Human Rights: Law, Policy and
Process 2d. ed. (Cincinnati, Ohio: Anderson Publishing Co., 1996) 210.
147. N. Questiaux, Study of the Implications for Human Rights of Recent Developments
Concerning Situations Known as States of Siege or Emergency, supra note 18. The origins of
the office of Special Rapporteur on States of Emergency lay in ECOSOC Resolution 1985/37,
authorizing the Sub-Commission to make the appointment. Another important study under-
taken by the Sub-Commission on states of emergency is E.-I. Daes, The Individual's Duties to
the Community and the Limitations on Human Rights and Freedoms under Article 29 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/432/Rev. 2 (1983). The
subject of human rights and their protection during emergencies has also featured, more or less
directly, in a number of other studies commissioned by the Sub-Commission, including: D.
Turk and L. Joinet, Preliminary Report on the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression,
UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1990/11; L. Joinet, Report on the Practice ofAdministrative Deten-
tion, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1990/29; and The Right to a Fair Trial: Brief Report Prepared
by Mr. Stanislav Chernichencko and Mr. William Treat in Accordance with Resolution 1989/
27 of the Sub-Commission, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1990/34.
148. In his 1989 report, for instance, Mr. Despouy bemoaned that "Given the increased
burden on the Secretariat and the modest means made available for his study until now, the
Special Rapporteur does not have all the assistance he needs to fulfil his obligations. Adequate
assistance would mean, at the minimum, the availability of permanent human resources [he has
had only temporary assistance so far] and, if possible, an increase in such assistance, as well
as data-processing equipment for his own use"; UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1989/30/Rev. 1, 10 at
para. 27.
149. E.g., Ethiopia (1991), Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia (1992), Philippines, Uganda
(1993), Haiti (1994), Mauritania (1995).
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wider issues connected with emergencies, 150 though not in any great
depth, and to identify some trends and draw some broad conclusions from
his work so far.'5 ' His efforts at establishing and maintaining contacts
with governments have been reasonably successful: as well as carrying
on a fruitful dialogue with government representatives in Geneva, the
Special Rapporteur has undertaken visits to Russia, Haiti and the Repub-
lic of Korea' where he had useful exchanges of views with the
respective governments. Since 1992, he has more vigorously sought
information from governments about any emergencies or emergency
measures initiated by them, often following up reports which appeared in
the mass media.'53
One of the areas in which the Special Rapporteur has not succeeded in
meeting the targets which he set for himself is to provide detailed and
comprehensive analyses of the emergencies listed in his annual reports,
touching such aspects as: the cause of those emergencies, the degree and
extent to which rights and freedoms have been suspended, and the impact
they have had on different population groups.'54 The Special Rapporteur
could also be criticized for not following up vigorously enough the
repeated requests of the Commission and the Sub-Commission to exam-
ine in depth defacto emergency situations, although it must be acknowl-
edged that he has shed some of his earlier excessive caution in dealing
with such situations.
Despite its shortcomings, the mechanism of Special Rapporteur has,
on the whole, served a useful purpose. There is clearly room for improve-
ment, including a need to make the mechanism assume a more active role
150. E.g., the importance of the principles of non-discrimination and proportionality in
derogation measures (1990); the link between arbitrary detention and states of emergency
(1991); the impact of defacto states of emergency on human rights (1993) and of emergencies
on non-derogable rights (1994); and the role of habeas corpus to guarantee non-derogable
rights (1996).
151. See, e.g., the Special Rapporteur's eighth annual report, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1995/
20, 5-8 at paras. 10-16.
152. His visit to Russia was carried out in the context of the advisory services of the UN Centre
for Human Rights (see UN Doc. E/CN/4/Sub.2/1993/23, 47-48, at paras. 78-83), while those
to Haiti and the Republic of Korea were undertaken in his personal capacity.
153. See, e.g., UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/23, 31 at para. 23.
154. References to such targets can be found, for example, in the Special Rapporteur's reports
for 1989 and 1993, UN Docs. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1989/30/Rev. 1, 9 at para. 26 and E/CN.4/Sub.2/
1993/23, 33 at para. 18.
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in monitoring emergencies, but any such improvement is contingent
upon the mechanism being better resourced. 155
3. Other UN Mechanisms
The subject of states of emergency has also featured in the work of other
bodies and mechanisms within the United Nations system, albeit less
directly. Of particular relevance in this context are the various thematic156
and country specific 57 rapporteurs, working groups, independent ex-
perts and special representatives established by either the Commission or
the Sub-Commission from time to time. These mechanisms deal, in a
comparatively less politicized manner, with a variety of human rights
issues that are a matter of concern in emergency situations, such as the
protection of non-derogable rights. Their work has, on the whole, been
seen to be fairly effective, both in highlighting patterns of abuses and, to
a lesser extent, in offering redress to victims.
155. The likelihood of the mechanism receiving any boost to its resources appears remote at
the moment. Indeed, the portents for the future of the mechanism were, in early 1997, rather
bleak, with speculation being rife that its mandate might be terminated, or subsumed within
another mechanism, when it came up for renewal at the 1997 session of the Sub-Commission.
A resolution adopted by the Sub-Commission in 1996 requested the Special Rapporteur to
"submit [his] final conclusions" in his tenth annual report, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1996/L.45,
2 at para. 2. In its 1995 annual report, the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention recommended
that the Commission should consider merging the mandate of the Special Rapporteur with that
of its own; see UN Doc. E/CN.4/1995/31, 19 at para. 56. However, in August 1997, the Sub-
Commission decided to keep the mechanisms separate and to renew the mandate of the Special
Rapporteur. Mr. Leandro Despouy was however replaced by a new Rapporteur, Mr. loan
Maxim, who was asked to submit an eleventh annual report in August 1998 containing an
updated list of States which have proclaimed or extended a state of emergency, together with
further recommendations on the protection of human rights during states of emergency; see
Resolution 1997/27, Question of human rights and states of emergency, UN Doc. E/CN.4/
1998/2; E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/50 at 67. One change introduced by this resolution to the mandate
of the Special Rapporteur was that, in future, he would be required to submit a list of countries
which have terminated a state of emergency only once every five years instead of annually.
156. E.g., Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances (1980-present);
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (1991-present); Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial,
Summary or Arbitrary Executions (1982-present); Special Rapporteur on Torture (1985-
present); Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance (1986-present); Special Rapporteur on
Freedom of Opinion and Expression (1993-present); Special Rapporteur on the Independence
and Impartiality of the Judiciary, Jurors and Assessors and the Independence of Lawyers
(1994-present).
157. E.g., Special Rapporteur on Equatorial Guinea (1993-present); Independent Expert on
Somalia (1993-present); Special Rapporteur on Afghanistan (1984-present); Special Rappor-
teuron Iraq (1991 -present); Special Rapporteur on Burma (1992-present); Special Rapporteur
on the Former Yugoslavia (1992-present); Special Rapporteur/Representative on Rwanda
(1994-present); Special Rapporteur on Zaire (1994-present).
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Most of these bodies have flexible procedures which allow for ease of
access by individuals and groups. 58 They are also seen to be more
transparent'59 and reasonably prompt in dealing with complaints.
60
Some of them have used innovative working methods 6' to maximize
their effectiveness. On the negative side, they 62 have sometimes been
criticized for their reluctance to explicitly pin blame on governments,
even when it is clear that a government is guilty of acts of commission or
omission. Some have also been criticized for producing reports which are
"descriptive and statistical rather than analytical."' '63
Some of these bodies have specifically noted the link between states
of emergency and the abuses which fall within their mandate,1 64 and their
experience in dealing with such patterns of abuse which may be helpful
in devising the international "measures of special vigilance" which
158. All that is required in most cases to activate these mechanisms is a simple letter from a
victim of a human right violation or from any concerned individual or group.
159. As well as keeping their correspondents informed of the progress of their respective
cases, these mechanisms publish fairly detailed annual reports in which statistical data and
information about government responses are included. The Working Group on Arbitrary
Detention has stated that, even where a detained person whose case it has taken up is released,
it "reserves the right to decide.., whether or not the deprivation of liberty was arbitrary"; see
UN Doc. E/CN.4/1995/31, 23 at para. 14. This Working Group has also set out publicly, and
in great detail, its methods of working; see, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1997/4, Annex I.
160. The Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances has, for instance,
evolved a very successful "urgent action" procedure under which its Chair is authorized, in
appropriate cases, to raise allegations of "disappearances" with governments by telegram as
soon as such allegations are drawn to its attention. Similar procedures have been set up by some
of the other mechanisms also.
161. They undertake, for instance, on-site visits to countries which are the subject of their
concerns, both to gain first hand knowledge of the local situation and to engage the
governments concerned in a dialogue. No less noteworthy is the decision of the Working Group
on Arbitrary Detention to adopt an openly "adversarial" investigative procedure in relation to
complaints received (see UN Doc. E/CN.4/1995/31, 21, at Annex 1, para. 2) and its practice
of publishing formal "decisions" taken on such complaints; see, e.g., UN Doc. E/CN.4/1995/
3 1/Add. 1.
162. E.g., the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances.
163. International Law Association, Interim Report of the Committee on the Enforcement of
Human Rights Law (London: 1986) 34 at para. 68 about the Working Group on Enforced or
Involuntary Disappearances [hereinafter "ILA Interim Report"].
164. The Working Group on Arbitrary Detention has, for instance, affirmed that abuse of
states of emergency, and exercise of the powers specific to states of emergency without a
formal declaration are among "the main causes for arbitrary deprivation of liberty"; see UN
Doc. E/CN.4/1995/31, 15-16 at paras.38-39. A resolution adopted by the Commission on
Human Rights in 1997 renewing the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion
and Expression similarly noted that the persecution of persons who exercise their right to those
freedoms is aggravated inter alia by states of emergency.
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Questiaux called for in her 1982 study. 165 Unfortunately, the information
provided by these mechanisms is not always used effectively by the
plenary bodies within the UN system. For example, non-governmental
human rights monitors have criticized the Commission on Human Rights
for ignoring well documented findings by the Working Group on En-
forced or Involuntary Disappearances that "disappearances" are endemic
in Turkey. 166 One possible way in which the work of such mechanisms
can be put to better use in the global efforts to moderate emergency
regimes is by achieving a greater coordination between these mecha-
nisms and between them and the major plenary bodies in the UN system.
Yet another mechanism that is available to deal with emergency
situations under the United Nations system, albeit one whose effective-
ness appears rather limited, is a special inter-sessional meeting of the
Commission on Human Rights. 167 This mechanism has only been used
once so far, in August 1992, in response to the developments in the former
Yugoslavia. 168 The most obvious benefit of such a meeting is that it would
provide a visible and high profile platform for intergovernmental discus-
sions, but whether it could be used to trigger stronger, more direct
international action to halt human rights abuses is uncertain. In the case
of the former Yugoslavia, all that resulted from the meeting was the
appointment of a Special Rapporteur who has carried out a number of
investigative visits to report on the scale and intensity of human rights
abuses in the territory.
More effective has been the recent use of the Security Council to deal
with emergency situations, including the protection of human rights. The
Council's intervention in Iraq in 1991 and in Kosovo in 1999 offer the
165. Questiaux, supra note 18. Also, reports of mechanisms such as the Special Rapporteur
on Torture or the Special Rapporteur on Summary and Arbitrary Executions can help in
identifying the extent of abuse of non-derogable rights and thus help in assessing the efficacy
of the derogation provisions.
166. See, e.g., Amnesty International, 1997 UN Commission on Human Rights - 50 years old
(London: January 1997, Al Index: IOR 41/01/97) at 5.
167. Such a meeting can be convened under ECOSOC Resolution 1990/48 whenever
members of the Commission feel the need.
168. This special session was convened "to discuss the dangerous situation in the former
Yugoslavia"-see Letter dated 5 August 1992 from the Permanent Representative of the
United States of America to the United Nations Office in Geneva, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1992/S-
1/2.
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most prominent examples of this technique. 69 It needs to be noted,
however, that resort to the Security Council is beset by a number of
problems, not least of which being the high degree of politics involved in
persuading the Council to adopt resolutions on such matters. However,
with the decreasing ideological polarization among member states fol-
lowing the end of the Cold War, this technique might yet provide an
effective way forward in dealing with at least some of the graver crisis
situations, as has been demonstrated in Bosnia in the mid-1990s and,
more recently, in Kosovo, where, despite sharp disagreements between
Security Council members, a NATO led coalition of security forces was
ultimately established by authority of Security Council resolutions.
These actions hold out the possibility of increasing involvement by the
Security Council in future emergency situations.
4. Initiatives by Non-Governmental Organizations
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have been playing an increas-
ingly prominent role in promoting human rights worldwide, including in
emergency situations. As well as monitoring abuses, they are active in
lobbying, campaigning, providing relief and rehabilitation to victims, 70
and assisting in standard setting at both domestic and international levels.
NGOs vary quite considerably in size, structures, objectives, mandates,
public profiles, working practices and political/ideological orientation.
Many of them define human rights to encompass concerns which go
beyond those enumerated in the international instruments; few, if any,
focus exclusively on states of emergency, though several have shown a
special interest in the subject.'7 '
169. Under Resolution 688, the Council authorised the use of all necessary force by member
states to protect the 'safe zones' created for Kurds within Iraqi territory. This led to a sustained
and concerted military action in the region by a UN force comprising defence personnel from
several Western countries, led by the United States of America. In the case of Kosovo, by
Resolution 1244, the Security Council authorized a NATO led security force (known as KFOR)
to establish a "secure environment" for the safe return of the Kosovar Albanians displaced by
the campaign of ethnic cleansing waged against them by the government of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia.
170. The most prominent example in this category is the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC), which is an atypical NGO in several ways, not least because of its unusual
organizational structure, the special status it enjoys under the Geneva Conventions, and its
predominantly government based funding. The ICRC enjoys unprecedented access amongst
NGOs to countries experiencing armed conflict or internal strife: its humanitarian initiatives,
particularly prison visits and tracing activities, have been widely acclaimed.
171. E.g., Amnesty International, the International Commission of Jurists and the Interna-
tional Law Association (all of whom have published reports or studies concerning emergency
regimes and their effects on human rights). Among academic institutions, the Queen's
University of Belfast deserves special mention: it has, since 1990, been involved in creating
an international database on emergency regimes with a global focus.
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By far the most valuable contribution made by NGOs to the interna-
tional efforts at moderating states of emergency has been made in their
role as providers and disseminators of information. Much of the informa-
tion that drives the work of intergovernmental bodies charged with
monitoring human rights abuses, whether on a thematic or territorial
basis, comes from NGOs.'72 The Special Rapporteur on States of Emer-
gency has, for example, relied heavily on the detailed country by country
documentation supplied by Amnesty International since the inception of
his mandate.'73 NGOs have also, through their campaigns and special
studies, galvanized public opinion from time to time on specific aspects
of human rights protection, which in turn has helped launch focused
international initiatives. A striking example is the publication in 1983 of
the International Commission of Jurists' widely acclaimed study on
states of emergency1 74 which triggered the UN Sub-Commission's sub-
sequent initiatives on the subject.
NGOs have also been quite active in the area of standard setting vis-
ji-vis states of emergency. In September 1984, the International Law
Association (ILA) issued a set of guidelines 7 1 which were aimed at
clarifying the standards governing the initiation, use and termination of
emergency powers. A few months earlier another non-governmental
initiative, sponsored by aconsortium ofNGOs, 176 had produced a similar
document 177 which focused on the limitation and derogation provisions
of the ICCPR. More recently, the Association of International Consult-
ants on Human Rights (CID) helped draft model legal provisions govern-
172. Eloquent testimony to this contribution can be found in the reports of the various Special
Rapporteurs and Working Groups discussed above. The Special Rapporteur on Freedom of
Opinion and Expression has, for instance, characterised as "primordial" the role played by
NGOs in fulfilling his mandate; see UN Doc. E/CN.4/1995/32, 44 at para. 140. The Special
Rapporteur on Summary or Arbitrary Executions has publicly acknowledged that without the
contribution of NGOs to his efforts, "very little could have been done"; see UN Doc. E/CN.4/
1993/46, 167, para. 690.
173. See, e.g., UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/19, 8-9, para. 34.
174. States of Emergency: Their Impact on Human Rights (Geneva: International Commis-
sion of Jurists, 1983).
175. "The Paris Minimum Standards of Human Rights Norms in a State of Emergency,"
adopted by the 61 st Conference of the International Law Conference (Paris, 26 August- 1
September, 1984), reprinted in (1985) 79 A.J.I.L. 1072 [hereinafter "Paris Minimum Stan-
dards"].
176. The NGOs involved were: the International Commission of Jurists; the International
Association of Penal Law; the American Association for the International Commission of
Jurists; the Urban Morgan Institute of Human Rights; and the International Institute of Higher
Studies in Criminal Sciences. These organizations brought together a group of 31 distinguished
experts in international law in Siracusa, Italy.
177. "The Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights" (April-May, 1984), Annex to UN Doc. E/CN.4/
1985/4, reprinted in (1985) 7 Hum. Rts. Q. 3 [hereinafter "Siracusa Principles"].
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ing states of emergency for possible use as a reference model by
governments.178 The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
has also, over the years, been involved in standard setting, albeit mostly
in the area of international humanitarian law. 79 As recently as 1997, the
ICRC and a number of NGOs cooperated with the United Nations in a
new initiative to consider the desirability of producing a declaration of
minimum humanitarian standards which would be applicable in all
situations of internal violence. 80
IV. IGOs and NGOs - an Evaluation
It is manifest from the foregoing survey of the activities of various
intergovernmental and non-governmental bodies and mechanisms that,
for all their shortcomings, they have made a useful, if limited, contribu-
tion to the international efforts at monitoring and moderating human
rights abuses during states of emergency. Not surprisingly, some of them
have been more successful than others. It is generally recognized that the
regional IGO systems for human rights protection have been consider-
ably more effective' 8 ' than their global counterpart, created under the
ICCPR. Furthermore, among the regional mechanisms, the Inter-Ameri-
can system seems to have fared better than the European system. Most
human rights scholars would also agree that, within the UN system, some
of the mechanisms have achieved a higher degree of success in tackling
the human rights problems associated with emergencies than others.
Even so, the overall picture that emerges from the experience of the
working of these institutions is one of some disappointment, not least
because, despite the efforts described, emergency regimes continue to
178. "Guidelines for the Development of Legislation on States of Emergency," reproduced
in UN Doc. E/CN.4ISub.2/1991/28, Annex 1 at 30-60.
179. The ICRC adopts a more hands-on approach to standard setting: it does not shy away
from presenting draft texts of new instruments to international diplomatic conferences. In
1988, its chief legal officer, Hans-Peter Gasser, was involved in an initiative which straddled
the worlds of international human rights law and humanitarian law. He prepared and circulated
a draft code of conduct for states experiencing internal strife, which, in the event, did not receive
institutional support from the ICRC; see H-P. Gasser, "A Measure of Humanity in Internal
Disturbance and Tensions: Proposals for a Code of Conduct" (1988) 28 Int'l. Rev. Red
Cross 38.
180. See UN Docs. E/CN.4/1998/87 and E/CN.4/1998/87/Add. 1.
181. It needs to be acknowledged, of course, that measuring "effectiveness" in the area of
human rights monitoring during emergencies is not easy. The International Law Association,
whilst noting that this concept is "multi-faceted" and "elusive", has identified six possible
critieria for such measurement: (1) exposing the fact of human rights abuse; (2) stopping or
moderating abuses during the course of an emergency; (3) providing redress to individual
victims through findings of violations, compensation, rehabilitation, release from detention, or
clarification of the fate of missing persons; (4) securing punishment of violators; (5) terminat-
ing a state of emergency; and (6) prevention of possible future abuses or invalid imposition of
emergency measures; see ILA Interim Report, supra note 163 at 7.
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flourish, even proliferate, and human rights abuses continue to occur
pervasively under such regimes. Many factors have been identified for
this state of affairs, which may be classed under four broad heads:
structural, definitional, institutional and practical.
1. Structural Problems
Among the structural factors, the foremost problem is that, for all the
exertions of the international community in the cause of the universality
of human rights, governments are still notoriously reluctant to subject
themselves to any real outside scrutiny. This reluctance becomes particu-
larly marked during periods of crisis, when most administrations feel that
they, and they alone, are capable of appreciating the threat to their
national security, and that any outside intervention is at best an unneces-
sary distraction and at worst an intolerable intrusion into their domestic
affairs. Even if this reluctance is not based on any doctrinal opposition to
outside scrutiny, governments may still be less than willing to engage,
except in the most superficial manner, with any foreign initiatives on the
purely practical grounds that they "wish to be bound by as few constraints
as possible" 82 when faced with the task of ensuring the survival of the
nation. As long as this powerful notion of national sovereignty continues
to hold sway, no international mechanism with any real strength to
oversee the conduct of emergency regimes is likely to command wide-
spread acceptance.
Secondly, there is still a high degree of indifference to, suspicion of,
and disagreement over international standards on human rights amongst
both governments and peoples all over the world. Even among those
countries which are sympathetic to the principle of universality, there is
often genuine concern that not enough heed is being paid to social,
cultural and other similar differences which may sometimes seriously put
in question the relevance of rigid, all embracing universal standards. Put
simply, the global consensus on human rights is still rather fragile.
A concrete example of this fragility of consensus can be seen in the
area of non-derogable rights. There is still strong disagreement among
governments over the appropriateness of some of the rights designated as
non-derogable by the three major treaties, and this disagreement cannot
but affect the way the treaties are implemented in different parts of the
world. Yet, rather than attempting to resolve this disagreement, the
human rights movement appears, effectively, to have turned a deaf ear to
182. See S.P. Marks, "Principles and Norms of Human Rights Applicable in Emergency
Situations: Underdevelopment, Catastrophes and Armed Conflicts" in K. Vasak, ed., The
International Dimensions of Human Rights, vol. 1 (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press,
1982) 175 at 204.
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the protestations of the doubters, and gone on to claim an expanded list
of non-derogable rights in many of its recent initiatives on the subject.
The Paris Minimum Standards, for instance, list as many as 16 rights
which are considered non-derogable, including the right to a name, equal
rights between men and women as to marriage, the right of equal access
to public service and the right of a child to special protection by family,
society and the state. 83 While few would quarrel with the desirability of
such rights in any democratic society, many might nevertheless wonder
if these rights are so paramount as to deserve special protection on a par
with, say, the right to life during a state of emergency.'84 Besides, it can
legitimately be argued that such over ambitiousness, however well
intentioned, runs the risk of proving counter productive in the long run.
From a purely practical view, therefore, there is a strong case for keeping
the list of non-derogable rights short. As one leading commentator has
argued, a short list "would have focused attention on those fundamental
rights which should be especially protected in emergencies."'85 This is
not to question either the validity of universalism or the need for
expanding existing standards; it is, rather, a plea for gradualism.
Thirdly, all the efforts that have gone into promoting and publicizing
international standards on human rights seem to have made precious little
impact on the status of domestic law in many countries. The exhortation,
contained in all the major instruments, urging states to take necessary
legislative measures to give effect to these standards in their municipal
law, 186 has gone largely unheeded, with a large number of national
constitutions still being out of step with those standards. 81 This, again,
reflects very poorly on the seriousness with which governments and
people, by and large, take international standards.
183. Paris Minimum Standards, supra note 175 at 1075-1081 (Sec. (C), Arts. 1-16).
184. The inclusion of another right, viz. not to be imprisoned merely on the ground of inability
to fulfil a contractual obligation, in the ICCPR's list of non-derogable rights is similarly
questionable. One writer has called its inclusion "bizarre," contrasting it with the lower priority
accorded to the right not to be arbitrarily deported, which, in his opinion, deserves greater
protection during emergencies: see T. Meron, Human Rights Law-Making in the United
Nations: A Critique of Instruments and Process (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986) at 92. A
strong case can also be made for the inclusion of the right to judicial remedies - a right
recognized explicitly only in the American Convention.
185. J. OraA, Human Rights in States of Emergency in International Law (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1992) 95.
186. E.g., ICCPR Art. 2(2), American Convention Art. 2.
187. See, e.g., R.E. Norris & P.D. Reiton, "The Suspension of Guarantees: A Comparative
Analysis of the American Convention on Human Rights and the Constitutions of the States
Parties" (1981) 30 Am. U. L. Rev. 189.
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2. Definitional Problems
As for definitional problems, the unsatisfactory phraseology concerning
the kind of emergency situations which justify derogation by govern-
ments remains a source of potential conflict. The ICCPR refers to "public
emergency which threatens the life of the nation,"'88 the European
Convention to "war or other public emergency threatening the life of the
nation,"' 8 9 and the American Convention to "war, public danger, or other
emergency that threatens the independence or security of a State Party." 90
It would appear that the latter instrument lays down a slightly more
flexible standard than the other two,' 9' although the terminology adopted
by the ICCPR itself could be faulted for being not sufficiently restric-
tive. 92 There may be some merit in tightening up the provisions by
specifying more clearly the types of situations, e.g. war, external aggres-
sion, armed rebellion and so on, which may justify a derogation.
Secondly, there is no clear guidance as to whether the threat envisaged
in the articles means a threat to the life of the state, of the government in
power, or of the people constituting that nation. 93 The American Con-
188. Art. 4(1). The framers of the ICCPR deliberately avoided the use of the word 'war' in
the article, because they felt that "the Covenant should not envisage, even by implication, the
possibility of war, as the UN was established with the object of preventing war." UN Doc. A/
2929, 67, para. 39.
189. Art. 15(1).
190. Art. 27(1). The rationale for using the phrase "public danger" was that this term was seen
as covering natural disasters which were not necessarily a threat to the independence or security
of a nation; see Buergenthal & Norris, eds., The Inter-American System (New York: Oceana,
1982) Vol. 1, Booklet 12, 135.
191. But the adjudications of the Inter-American Commission are reassuring: the terminol-
ogy has been given much the same interpretation as that used in the ICCPR and European
Convention; see Orad, supra note 185 at 27.
192. But this phrase was used in preference to one which enumerated in detail the various
types of emergencies that could justify derogations. A suggestion, for example, to substitute
the phrase "a state of emergency caused by an enemy invasion or a state of war or in the case
of public commotion or disaster gravely upsetting the normal life in the territory of a State" was
rejected; see UN Doc. E/CN.4/660, 10, at para. 26. It has been argued that, notwithstanding the
generality of the terminology adopted, the Human Rights Committee has, through its reviews
of states parties' reports and its opinions under the Optional Protocol, put a fairly restrictive
construction on the article; see e.g. Orad, supra note 185 at 20-22.
193. Interestingly, during the drafting of the ICCPR, the phrase "threatening the life of the
nation" was chosen in preference to other phrases such as "threatening the interests of the
people" and "threatening the security, safety and general welfare of the people" even though
it was pointed out that the latter phrases "were more appropriate in a covenant which dealt with
the rights of individuals and that such a phrase would also prohibit Governments from acting
contrary to the interests and welfare of their people"; see M.J. Bossuyt, Guide to the "Travaux
Priparatoires" of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Dordrecht:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1987) at 85-86. The reason why references to 'people' were dropped was
because it was felt that this term may not be construed as encompassing all people in a country,
but only some people; see UN Doc. E/CN.4/SR. 330, 14.
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vention appears to lean on the side of the state,194 though such an
interpretation is by no means conclusive. The danger flowing from this
ambiguity in language is that it may be exploited by an autocratic regime
to declare an emergency and enter extensive derogations in circum-
stances where the only threat is to its own life, for example, through a
popular uprising, as happened in India in 1975, rather than to the security
of its people. 95 One writer has suggested that a solution to this problem
might be "to accept such a claim only in favour of democratic political
systems, but to deny it to totalitarian regimes," although as he himself
fairly concedes, "[i]deas about democracy and about a preferred political
order are too diverse to provide a viable consensus on this question."',
96
Thirdly, it is not clear whether the provisions cited apply to localized
emergencies, however serious, but which only affect a small and clearly
defined section of the population and not the whole country. The
guidance offered by European case law on this point would suggest that,
at least in theory, they do not. In the Lawless case, the European Court of
Human Rights held that the emergency must be one threatening "the
whole population,"' 197 although in practice, that standard has not been
applied strictly, as the example of Britain testifies. The British govern-
ment has filed a number of derogation notices concerning emergencies
obtaining in Northern Ireland and even further afield, e.g. in some of its
overseas colonies, but whose terms have covered the population of Great
Britain as well. 98 All of these notices have gone unchallenged. Perhaps
it might have been more desirable to use language similar to that used in
the Paris Minimum Standards which defines a 'public emergency' as an
exceptional situation affecting "the whole population or the whole
population of the area to which the declaration [of emergency] ap-
plies."'199
194. Art. 27(1) of the American Convention refers to "war, public danger, or other emergency
that threatens the independence or security of a State Party."
195. The Mexican Constitution (Art. 29) attempts to avoid this problem by using an
alternative phraseology, namely, "emergency which may place society in grave danger" But
this is no more satisfactory, given the vagueness of the term "society."
196. C. Schreuer, "Derogation of Human Rights in Situations of Public Emergency: The
Experience of the European Convention on Human Rights" (1982) 9 Yale J. World Pub.
Ord. 113 at 122.
197. Lawless v. Ireland, supra note 48 at para. 28.
198. A classic example is a derogation notice filed in 1955 concerning an emergency in
British Guyana; see (1955-57) 1 Y.B. E.C.H.R. 48.
199. Art. 1(b), Paris Minimum Standards, supra note 175 at 1073 (Sec. (A), Art. 1(b)).
200. (1955-57) 1 Y.B. E.C.H.R. 48 at 56, para. 112.
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3. Institutional problems
With regard to the institutional factors, it has been suggested that the
current machinery for monitoring states of emergency does not amount
to a coherent system. The IGOs, for instance (which form the backbone
of the system), have been criticized for "their tendency ... to deal, and
then only erratically, with the symptoms of states of emergency rather
than with the concept itself or with causes or prevention of human rights
abuses under emergency regimes.
' 200
Secondly, and self-evidently, lack of resources has also played a major
role in reducing the effectiveness of the human rights monitoring system
overall, especially at the intergovernmental level. Inadequate research
and administrative support, cuts in travel provision for fact finders,
cancellation of scheduled periodic meetings, and a host of other similar
constraints have impaired both the thoroughness of data collection and
the speed and sufficiency of response.
Thirdly, much of the international discourse and action on human
rights is still vitiated by political posturing and manipulation, which
means that the system as a whole suffers all too often from a crisis of
credibility. Although the ending of the Cold War has eased some of the
sharper ideological tensions between nations, it has not led to any let-up
in the passion with which states protect and advance their own interests
or those of their allies in international fora, often at considerable cost to
the cause of human rights. Instances are legion, in bodies such as the
Commission on Human Rights, of governments consistently and fiercely
resisting moves to condemn abuses committed by certain regimes even
where the evidence of such abuses is overwhelming."' NGOs too often
tend to be similarly selective in their fingering of governments for
condemnation. As a result, the "even-handed and comprehensive scru-
201. A telling example of such resistance can be found in the treatment of a resolution
featured in the 1997 session of the Commission concerning China. This resolution was defeated
after a bitter and acrimonious tussle involving two factions of the 15 member European Union
bloc. This defeat was accomplished by the questionable practice of invoking a rule which
allows members of the Commission to prevent substantive discussion of any draft resolution
where the subject matter of the resolution is addressed by two or more proposals. In the case
of China, there was only one draft resolution tabled before the Commission.
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tiny of human rights abuses associated with emergencies"2 °2 which the
ILA saw as a sine qua non for any effective monitoring regime has failed
to materialize.
203
Fourthly, the working of the existing mechanisms of international
surveillance have revealed a number of deficiencies and lacunae which
need urgent attention if the system is to be improved. Prominent among
the problems are:
(1) The Insufficiency of the Reporting Practices of Derogating
Governments
Under Article 4(1) of the ICCPR, governments which avail themselves
of the power to derogate from any of the Covenant's provisions are
required to notify fellow member states (through the Secretary-General
of the United Nations) of the provisions concerned and to provide the
reasons for the derogation. 204 However, in actual practice, most govern-
ments do no more than submit bland, sketchy notices of derogation which
make a general reference to the difficulties faced by them and which
simply list the various treaty articles suspended. What is lacking, as Joan
Hartman has pointed out, is "data on the actual extent to which emergency
measures are being applied. Detailed information on the number of
detainees, banned associations or censored publications is not required to
be divulged unless an enforcement proceeding ensues."2 5 This leaves the
Human Rights Committee with very little hard information on which to
assess the legitimacy of the derogation.
(2) The Inadequacy of Procedures to Review Derogations
None of the three international instruments contains any mechanism for
a prompt and automatic review by their respective enforcement bodies of
the legitimacy of derogations. Indeed, none of them even imposes a
formal obligation on either a state party or the respective Secretaries-
202. See, e.g., ILA Second Interim Report, supra note 29 at 43.
203. One of the glaring examples of this lack of even handedness, often criticized by objective
observers, is the continued discriminatory treatment meted out to Israel in the Commission on
Human Rights. Not only is that country systematically excluded from membership of the
Commission, but it is singled out for condemnation under a special agenda item year after year.
Also, the mandate of the Special Rapporteur appointed to examine human rights practices in
the Israeli-Occupied Territories has been defined unprecedentedly widely and without any
limit on its duration (currently the only such open-ended mandate within the UN system).
204. There is a broadly similar requirement under the European Convention Art. 15(3),
though what it asks for is information about the "measures" taken by the government as well
as reasons for the derogation.
205. J.F. Hartman, "Derogation from Human Rights Treaties in Public Emergencies" (1981)
22 Harv. Int'l. L.J. 1 at 20.
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General to inform the enforcement bodies of derogation notices. °6 A
modest attempt by the Human Rights Committee in 1982 to fill this gap,
by requiring the Secretary-General: (1) to transmit all derogation notices
to the Committee as soon as they are received; and (2) to impress upon all
derogating governments the need for them to keep the Committee
informed regularly of "the development of the emergency in so far as it
affects the implementation of the Covenant, '20 7 was deferred indefi-
nitely.
208
Another suggestion to improve the present situation is contained in the
Siracusa Principles, which require the Human Rights Committee to:
[D]evelop a procedure for requesting additional reports under Article
49(1)(b) from States Parties which have given notification of derogation
under Article 4(3) or which are reasonably believed by the Committee to
have imposed emergency measures subject to Article 4 constraints. Such
additional reports should relate to questions concerning the emergency
insofar as it affects the implementation of the Covenant and should be dealt
with by the Committee at the earliest possible date."°
Yet another proposal for improvement that has been mooted by Hartman
is to make the validity of derogations dependent upon adequacy of notice:
Such a construction of the derogation articles is supportable, though it
would impose a rather severe penalty on a neglectful state. The European
Commission has hinted that in a flagrant case it might adopt this approach,
but in actual practice compliance with article 15(3) has been analysed
independently of the central issue ofjustification for emergency measures.
The best solution for implementation organs would be to consider notice
violations separately, but to nullify the derogation in cases of deliberately
misleading or insufficient notice.
210
206. The ICCPR and the American Convention require states-parties to notify other states-
parties of derogations through the instrumentality of the Secretary-General of the UN and the
OAS respectively, while the European Convention merely requires states-parties to notify the
Secretary-General of the Council of Europe. This divergence between the European Conven-
tion and the other two treaties has been rectified by a resolution passed in 1956 by the
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe which asked the Secretary-General of that
body to forward all derogation notifications received to other states-parties; Resolution 16 of
26 September 1956, cited in S.R. Chowdhury, Rule of Law in a State of Emergency (London:
Pinter, 1989) at 92.
207. See UN Doc. CCPR/C/SR.349, para. 16.
208. A disturbing sidelight of that attempt was that, during the course of the debate on the
proposal, one of the Committee members appeared to question the jurisdiction of the
Committee to monitor emergency situations; see, P.R. Ghandhi, "The Human Rights Commit-
tee and Derogation in Public Emergencies", (1990) 32 German Y. B. Int'l. L. 323 at 334.
209. Principle 73, Siracusa Principles, supra note 177.
210. Hartman, supra note 205 at 22.
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(3) The Lack of Control over Reservations by Governments
The European Convention and the American Convention explicitly
permit reservations to be made to their provisions by states parties."' The
framers of the ICCPR, on the other hand, left the matter to be governed
by the customary rules of international law .212 The practical effect of both
approaches is much the same: reservations will only be valid under any
of the three instruments if they are not incompatible with the object and
purpose of the treaty concerned. The consensus of academic 2 3 and
judicial 214 opinion is that reservations to non-derogable rights are not
compatible with the object and purpose of any of the three treaties.
However, this has not prevented some states from entering reservations,
either generally to the derogation provisions 215 or to particular non-
derogable rights, 2 6 and the treaty enforcement bodies have been able to
211. Art. 64, European Convention; Art. 75, American Convention. The latter specifically
makes reservations subject to conformity with the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties (1969).
212. They recognized that "the right of a contracting party to make reservations to a
multilateral treaty was now an accepted principle, subject to the provision that such reserva-
tions were not incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty"; see UN Doc. A/6546,
at paras. 142-3. This principle has since been incorporated in the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties Art. 19(e). The Vienna Convention further requires that, for a reservation to be valid,
it must be confirmed by the state concerned at the time of its accession to the treaty and not later
(Art. 23(2)).
213. See, e.g., OraA, supra note 185 at 129; McGoldrick, supra note 97 at 306-7.
214. See, e.g., Belios v. Switzerland (1988), 132 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A). In this case, thejudges
ruled that Art. 64 of the European Convention "expressly prohibited reservations of a general
character and prohibited by implication those which were incompatible with the Convention"
(para. 52). See also The Effect of Reservations on the Entry into Force of the American
Convention on Human Rights, (1982), Advisory Opinion OC- 2/82 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser.
A), No. 2, and Restrictions to the Death Penalty... (1982), Advisory Opinion OC- 3/83 Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A), No. 3. In the latter Opinion, the court held that a reservation which sought
to empower a government to suspend any or all non-derogable rights was impermissible, but
"the situation would be different if the reservation sought merely to restrict certain aspects of
a non-derogable right without depriving the right of its basic purpose" (para. 61).
215. E.g., Trinidad and Tobago; see UN Doc. CCPR/1 1/Add. 1, at 477; France; see UN Doc.
CCPR/I I/Add. 1, at 470. Both of these reservations pertain to ICCPR Art. 4.
216. E.g., Congo (Art. 11, ICCPR - see UN Doc. CCPR/II/Add.1, at 469); Malta (Art.
2(2)(a), ICCPR - see UN Doc. CCPR/I l/Add.1, at 474); Barbados (Art. 4(4), American
Convention; see online: <http://www. oas. org/juridico/english/Sigsb-32 html> (accessed Feb.
16, 2000)); Portugal (Art. 7, European Convention; see online: <htm#PORTUGAL" http.//
www.coe.fr/tablconv/reservdecl/dr5e htm#PORTUGAL> (accessed Feb. 16, 2000)); Federal
Republic of Germany (Art. 7(2), European Convention; see online: <http://www.coe.fr/
tablconv/reservdecl/dr5e.htm#GERMANY> (accessed Feb. 16, 2000)); Mexico (Art. 18, Art.
25(b), ICCPR - see UN Doc. CCPR/I]/Add.1, at 475, and Arts. 12 & 23(2), American
Convention; see, online: <http://www.oas.org/juridico/englishSigsb-32. html> (accessed Feb.
16, 2000)); Uruguay (Art. 23(2), American Convention; see online: <http://www.oas.org/
juridico/english/Sigs/b-32.html> (accessed Feb. 16, 2000)).
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do precious little beyond criticizing such derogations and asking the
states concerned to withdraw them.
4. Practical problems
Foremost among the practical problems is the lack of sufficient coordi-
nation between the various components of the present system, especially
at the intergovernmental level, and this has led to unnecessary duplication
of efforts217 and occasionally even to friction between two or more
organs.2 ' Within the UN system, for example, it has been noted that there
is not enough dialogue and feedback between, say, the Commission on
Human Rights and the various thematic or country specific mechanisms,
to the detriment of effective action by the former." 9 A similar lack of
coordination has characterized the efforts of NGOs; a good example,
cited by the ILA, concerns submissions to the Special Rapporteur on
States of Emergency. So far there has been no attempt on the part of the
many NGOs who make such submissions to pool together their resources
to gather and collate the relevant information.
220
Secondly, many of the inter-governmental bodies tend to place too
much emphasis on consensus in their decision making which often leads
to anodyne resolutions that "reflect nothing more than the lowest com-
mon denominator devoid of content and significance, '22' even where the
gravity of a situation calls for strong condemnation. This has not only
prevented effective action being taken against governments who have
brazenly disregarded their solemn undertakings to protect and promote
human rights, but also undermined international efforts at standard
setting.
217. The potential for such duplication is, to some extent, being reduced by recent innovative
practices adopted by some of the UN organs. In 1994, for example, the Special Rapporteur on
Torture and the Special Rapporteur on Summary or Arbitrary Executions decided to undertake
a joint visit to Colombia instead of each of them undertaking a separate visit. The Special
Rapporteur on Torture also agreed that, where any case involved the mandates of more than
one UN mechanism, it would be permissible for each of those mechanisms to refer to
communications received by the other concerning the case, thus avoiding unnecessary overlap
and duplication of work; see UN Doc. E/CN.4/1995/34, 6-7, at paras. 8, 9. The Special
Rapporteur on Torture has often addressed urgent appeals in conjunction with other UN
mechanisms wherever possible; see, e.g., UN Doc. E/CN.4/1997/7.
218. In 1987, for instance, the UN Special Rapporteur on Chile expressed his displeasure over
a Sub-Commission resolution which was critical of the human rights practices in Chile, arguing
that this could jeopardize his relations with the Chilean government; see UN Doc. A/42/556,
at para. 72.
219. See, e.g., UN Doc. E/CN.4/1997/3, para. 72.
220. ILA Second Interim Report, supra note 29 at 38.
221. Amnesty International, 1997 UN Commission on Human Rights - 50 years old, supra
note 166 at 3.
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Thirdly, despite the heightened interest in states of emergency in
recent years, as reflected in the number and range of studies produced by
IGOs, NGOs and academic specialists, there is still a dearth of compre-
hensive comparative data, both factual and legal, on the practice of
emergency regimes in the different regions of the world. 222 It was hoped
that the work of the Special Rapporteur would fill this gap to a consider-
able extent, but that has proved not to be the case, largely because of
resource constraints.
V. Informal States of Emergency
The current international system of controls has also raised questions
concerning certain less clearly defined crisis situations that have been
described variously as "de facto," "institutionalized" or "ambiguous"
emergencies, or simply as repression. Although in these types of crisis
governments should, in theory, still be amenable to measures of surveil-
lance based on the concept of derogation, they do not always fit in easily
with the reference model underpinning much of the current regime of
controls. 223 For example, the absence of a formal declaration and notifi-
cation of such emergencies under the ICCPR or other relevant treaty
might make it difficult for the international community and the human
rights monitoring agencies to become aware of a large scale derogation
of human rights with the necessary degree of promptitude. Joan Hartman/
Fitzpatrick has identified some of the problems connected with these
regimes in her pioneering work for the ILA,24 and her typology of
emergencies offers a useful starting point for the analysis of such regimes.
De facto emergencies usually arise under one of the following two
circumstances: (i) when exceptional measures are applied by a govern-
ment without a state of emergency being formally declared; or (ii) when
exceptional measures are continued after a declared state of emergency
has been formally terminated. A good example of a defacto emergency
is that encountered in common law jurisdictions such as the United
Kingdom where there are no constitutional provisions for formal decla-
222. Questiaux highlighted this lack of comparative data in her 1982 study, supra note 18.
223. This reference model itself essentially conforms to the civil law model of emergency
powers.
224. See, e.g., ILA Second Interim Report, supra note 29 at 12-25, also discussed in
Fitzpatrick, supra note 17 at 8-21.
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rations of emergency 2 5 and where exceptional measures can be initiated
under ordinary legislation on either a temporary
22 6 or permanent 227
basis. 228 This would, in Hartman/Fitzpatrick' s analysis, be an example of
a "classic" defacto emergency, i.e. one whose invocation is justified by
the existence of genuine emergency conditions on the ground.
Hartman/Fitzpatrick has identified at least three other types of "clas-
sic" defacto emergencies: (i) where the government has chosen to rely on
ordinary law (which does not include any exceptional measure) to deal
with the crisis facing the country;229 (ii) where an ad hoc legal regime or
a state of lawlessness prevails (e.g., Lebanon); and (iii) where the
government, whilst terminating a formally declared state of emergency,
has allowed its effects to continue by incorporating harsh special security
laws into its ordinary legal regime.
Further down the scale are "ambiguous or potential" defacto emergen-
cies involving situations where the actual conditions on the ground do not
justify the declaration of emergency and where no formal emergency is
declared, but where the government resorts to sudden and unannounced
assaults on human rights using permanent special security laws. Such
laws are quite common in many countries, especially in the Common-
225. There is however a statute, the Emergency Powers Act 1920 (U.K., 10& 11 Geo. V, c.
56) which does provide for formal declarations of emergencies by the executive, and for the
promulgation of emergency regulations, whenever there have occurred or are about to occur
events of such a nature as are calculated to interfere with the supply of essential goods or
services to the community. Any emergency declared under this Act must be ratified by
Parliament within seven days. Several proclamations of emergency have been issued under this
Act, to deal with industrial action by, for example, coal miners (1921), bus and tram drivers
(1924), dockers (1948, 1970) and electricity workers (1970, 1973); see K. Jeffery & P.
Hennessy, States of Emergency: British Governments and Strikebreaking since 1919 (London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983).
226. E.g., the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Acts 1973-1996, enacted to deal with
terrorism relating to the affairs of Northern Ireland, whose major provisions had to be renewed
by Parliament each year.
227. E.g., the Defence of the Realm Consolidation Act 1914, supra note 22, under which the
government, i.e. the executive, could make regulations "for securing the public safety and the
defence of the realm" without parliamentary approval. This law was repealed, though not
immediately, after the cessation of hostilities in the First World War.
228. Even in jurisdictions that do have a written constitution, such as the United States of
America, but the constitution does not provide for a formal declaration of emergency, it has
been suggested that the exercise of powers by the executive during periods of (genuine) crisis
might constitute a defacto state of emergency. It has been argued that "emergency power was
an unconstitutional exercise of power by the executive," but was nevertheless justified by the
doctrine of necessity; see, e.g. Jules Lobel, "Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism"
(1989) 98 Yale L. J. 1385 at 1389.
229. Such a situation should not, says HartmanlFitzpatick, strictly be classified as a state of
emergency at all, and should not "trigger any extraordinary international scrutiny of human
rights conditions"; ILA Second Interim Report, supra note 29 at 17.
States of Emergency - Moderating their Effects on Human Rights
wealth,230 and are used, in Hartman/Fitzpatrick's words, to achieve a
variety of objectives, ranging from "preserving democratic government
in the face of an anti-democratic threat; to protecting an autocratic
government with some of the formal trappings of a democratic structure
from widespread demands for true democracy; to 'preserving' the power
of a government which has toppled a democratic regime in a sudden coup
d'etat; to counteracting the separatist pressures of an irredentist move-
ment or the threat of an armed opposition." 23 1 Interestingly enough, most
of the countries resorting to this technique are endowed with formidable
formal emergency powers as well. They do not, however, appear to be
particularly discriminating in their choice between the use of emergency
powers and of permanent security legislation.
It is not difficult to see the typological problems posed by such
situations. Their almost open-ended potential for derogation from some
of the most basic human rights makes them vulnerable to the label of
"permanent" emergencies;232 but where the crackdowns are relatively
infrequent and their effects confined to a small number of targets (as is
often the case with such situations), that label would seem exaggerated.
Hartman/Fitzpatrick's solution to the problem is to judge each case on its
merits. "Where the shift in government behaviour is sharp enough," she
says, "human rights monitors should treat the altered situation as a
functional emergency. '"233
The same solution has been suggested for yet another difficult type of
emergency, usually described as "institutionalized," under which a
government terminates a formal state of emergency which has gone on for
a long time in the absence of any real crisis, but not before creating an
similar regime under ordinary law. Though similar to the ambiguous or
potential defacto emergency described above, the important distinguish-
ing characteristic of this type of emergency is that there are no crisis
conditions present on the ground to justify its existence.234 South Africa
under apartheid presented a controversial example of this phenomenon:
in the mid-1980s the white minority government decided to end the
formal emergency proclaimed under the Public Safety Act 1953, but only
after it had replicated most of the emergency powers in its ordinary law.
230. E.g., Singapore and Malaysia (Internal Security Acts); India (Terrorist and Disruptive
Activities (Prevention) Act); Bangladesh (Special Powers Act).
231. ILA Second Interim Report, supra note 29 at 19.
232. For examples of such emergencies, see Chowdhury, supra note 206 at 47-49.
233. ILA Second Interim Report, supra note 29 at 22.
234. The most commonly cited example of an institutionalized emergency is from Paraguay,
where a military government which functioned under a formal state of emergency from 1954
onwards, ended that emergency in 1987 but simultaneously made such far reaching changes
to its ordinary laws that it was able to continue the status quo for several years.
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The controversy centred around whether there was an actual crisis
situation which justified the use of such powers.235 If there was, the
resulting regime would have been classified as a "classic" de facto
emergency; if not, it would qualify as an "institutionalized" emergency.
Finally, there is the category of countries which experience prolonged
repression of considerable severity, but without either a formal state of
emergency being declared by the government or the existence of genuine
crisis conditions on the ground. Hartman/Fitzpatrick believes that such
situations should not find any place in the classification of emergency
regimes, although they are a matter of serious concern to human rights
monitors. Arguably, most of the republics of the former Soviet Union and
its satellites in Eastern Europe would have qualified for this description
before the collapse of communism, but more recent examples under this
head would include military dictatorships such as the one under General
Sane Abacha which prevailed in Nigeria until last year. Another possible
candidate in this category might be North Korea, though some doubts
have been expressed about the exact status of that country in the typology
of emergency regimes.
23 6
VI. Assessing the Severity of Emergencies
The Hartman/Fitzpatrick classification, though comprehensive, is by no
means exhaustive. It does not, for instance, explicitly provide for what
Questiaux has called "complex" emergencies, 237 namely, "the great
number of parallel or simultaneous emergency rules whose complexity
is increased by the 'piling up' of provisions designed to 'regularise' the
immediately preceding situation and therefore embodying retroactive
rules and transitional regimes. ' 238 Nor does it offer precise guidance on
the differences between the various types and levels of real emergency,
or between the various levels in which the emergency measures may be
considered acceptable. That assessment can, it is submitted, be made by
applying the following four yardsticks.
235. The government argued that there was, citing the threat to the "life of the nation" from
anti-apartheid activists, whereas many in the human rights community rejected this argument
as untenable because, according to them, the threat was merely to the continuance of white
minority rule.
236. Hartman/Fitzpatrick, for instance, believes that the regime of repression in North Korea
could be regarded as an institutionalization of the formal emergency measures first introduced
in that country in 1950; see ILA Second Interim Report, supra note 29 at 24.
237. Questiaux, supra note 18 at 29-32. The example of Turkey, which she cited, illustrates
the difficulty with "complex" emergencies. Emergencies have been so often proclaimed in
Turkey that it is very difficult to ascertain the exact status of the legal regime at any given time.
238. Ibid. at 29 (para. 118).
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(1) The Factual Situation on the Ground
Despite the wide range of factual conditions which may give rise to an
emergency situation, it is possible to identify certain discrete types of
emergencies in the continuum between normality and the complete
breakdown of organized government, based on the severity of threats to
the established order.
239
At the lowest end of the scale are situations in which a small number
of organized disaffected groups resort to acts of sporadic but sustained
terrorist violence to achieve certain political, social or economic goals,
but who are not so powerful as to exercise control over any section of the
population or national territory. This may be termed 'low level emer-
gency' and a proper response to it might be the adoption of some special
measures, such as limited powers of administrative detention, stop and
search, and restrictions on movement of people and vehicles, but not a full
scale emergency. Examples of such emergency would include the situa-
tion arising in Peru from the activities of the Tupac-Amaru rebels, or of
the Baader/Meinhof gang in Germany in the 1970s.
Secondly, there are situations of 'preventive or repressive emergency'
in which, although there is no visible sign of violent dissent, there is an
underlying fear in the minds of the authorities-usually based on previ-
ous terrorist or other such activity by groups in society-that any
relaxation of controls on freedom of expression or association might lead
to large scale public disorder. This type of situation presents tremendous
difficulties to human rights monitors, because, while the suppression of
civil liberties will, in a large number of cases, be unjustified,2' ° on certain
occasions, it may constitute a legitimate response to a potentially serious
threat. In such circumstances, the adoption of slightly enhanced special
measures, proportionate to the threat, may be justified. Examples of such
emergency would include the situation in Malaysia immediately follow-
ing the racial riots of 1969, or in Algeria in the months preceding and
following the aborted 1991 general elections during which Islamic
fundamentalists sought to subvert the secular character of the state.
Thirdly, there are situations of serious 'internal tensions and distur-
bances' in which organized groups of armed dissidents engage in acts of
violence and looting which are more sustained, more frequent and more
widespread than in a low level emergency, but which may not yet have
reached civil war proportions. Here, the authorities may be justified in
imposing tougher restrictions on various freedoms and civil liberties,
239. Some of the discussion which follows is based on Hadden et al., Monitoring Human
Rights Abuses, supra note 28.
240. For example, the preventive detention of aliens during war time.
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including curfews. Examples of such emergency would include the
situation in Los Angeles immediately following the acquittal of the
policemen involved in alleged brutality against the black motorist,
Rodney King, in 1994.
At the top end of the scale would be situations involving full scale 'civil
war' or 'internal armed conflict' in which the level or threat of violence
is so high as to put the entire civilian population-or most of it-at risk.241
In such cases, resort to the severest of emergency measures (short of those
affecting non-derogable rights) may be justified. One of the problems
with crises like these is that, more often than not, they involve a collapse
of constitutional government, so that there is no administration with the
requisite authority present to oversee the implementation of the state of
emergency, or, sometimes, even to ensure that it is imposed properly.
Examples of such emergencies would include the situation in Bosnia
following the break-up of the former Yugoslavia (1991-96) or that in
north and northeastern Sri Lanka since the late 1970s.
It is, obviously, possible to identify more categories or levels of
emergency in this continuum-or to sub-classify some of the categories
identified, for example, by origin as political, religious or ethnic-but for
the practical purposes of making an assessment of the legitimacy of most
emergency regimes, the above classification will suffice.
(2) The Formal Legal Status of the Emergency
This feature will involve ascertaining whether an emergency is a formally
declared or undeclared one, thus allowing for its classification as dejure
or defacto, respectively. In carrying out this inquiry, the considerations
outlined by Hartman/Fitzpatrick are particularly relevant. As part of this
determination, it could also be ascertained, where appropriate, whether
the state concerned has complied with the notification requirements
under the ICCPR and/or a regional treaty. If the civil law model is adopted
as the reference model, then all undeclared ordefacto emergencies would
automatically be deemed to lack legitimacy.
241. These are situations to which Common Art. 3 of the Geneva Conventions would almost
invariably apply.
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(3) The Nature and Kind of Emergency Powers
This factor will be a key element in the assessment of the legitimacy or
otherwise of an emergency regime. Nearly all emergency measures
involve certain common characteristics in terms of the exercise of
powers, including:
(a) a substantial transfer of power from the legislature to the
executive, and/or substantial expansion in the powers of the
executive;
(b)the use of extended powers of arrest and detention to aid the
investigation of alleged terrorist or other politically motivated
activities;
(c) the use of administrative detention against persons suspected of
broadly defined anti-state activity;
(d)the use of special courts and/or special procedures to deal with
terrorist or other politically motivated offences;
(e) the use of newly created or enhanced penalties and punishments
of an especially severe nature, including the death penalty, against
those convicted of terrorism or other politically motivated offences;
(f) the imposition of wide ranging restrictions on the civil liberties
of citizens, and the suspension of constitutional guarantees concern-
ing human rights;
(g)a substantial reduction in powers of judicial review of executive
action, including the suspension of procedures such as habeas
corpus or amparo, and the conferment of immunity on members of
law enforcement agencies from prosecution for acts carried out in
pursuance of the emergency.
Each of the measures can then be checked for relevance and propor-
tionality to the level and intensity of the threat identified earlier.
(4) The Manner of Use of Emergency Powers
An inquiry into the actual use or abuse of the powers invoked is as
important as the determination under the previous head, if not more, in
arriving at an overall assessment of the legitimacy of an emergency
regime. This inquiry will cover, among other things, an evaluation of the
extent to which the various powers have been used, whether there have
been credible allegations or evidence of abuse, whether the principle of
non-derogability has been respected, whether security forces have been
properly instructed on the lawful limits to the use of force, whether those
instructions have been followed, and so on.
Clearly, this kind of determination would pose formidable problems,
not least because of the difficulties in obtaining sufficiently unbiased,
accurate and reliable information, but that should not be an argument for
inaction. A realistic approach might be to accept the limitations that are
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inherent in such an exercise, but to proceed nevertheless with gathering
as much credible data as can be obtained from both governmental and
non-governmental sources, checking and cross-checking such data to the
extent possible, seeking such corroboration as might be available, and
then using the most reliable part of the resulting information to make a
judgment. This process would be aided by suitable changes to the
notification/reporting system under the international human rights in-
struments to rectify some of their deficiencies identified above. In
particular, it would help if derogating governments were required to
submit detailed information about the emergency measures initiated by
them, including relevant statistical data, at frequent intervals after a
derogation has been entered.
It would, of course, be naive to expect governments to provide a
complete and unbiased picture of emergency conditions within their own
jurisdictions, so there is a clear need for information from other, less
subjective, sources. Human rights NGOs would figure high on any list of
such sources, as would independent think-tanks and academic institu-
tions, and such bodies should be drafted into the monitoring process as
much as possible. For many years now, the idea of a specialized data
centre to provide "a comprehensive and properly analysed listing of
contemporary emergencies and their various actual effects on enjoyment
of human rights"2 42 has been mooted by bodies like the ILA,2 43 and this
idea has been welcomed by some of the IGO agencies involved in work
on states of emergency. 244 A modest attempt at establishing such a data
centre was made by the Queen's University of Belfast in 1990, and initial
feedback on its pilot studies, carried out for the following five years, has
been quite encouraging.245
VII. Alternative Approaches to Controlling Emergency Regimes
For all the advances that have been made in studying the effects of states
of emergency in recent years, however, it would be idle to pretend that an
exclusive focus on this concept to tackle gross violations of human rights
world wide has been, or can ever be, wholly successful. Not only does the
concept present serious definitional problems, so that its value as a
242. Fitzpatrick, supra note 17 at 173.
243. See, e.g., ILA Second Interim Report, supra note 29 at 45.
244. E.g., the UN Special Rapporteur on States of Emergency; see UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/
1995/20. See also the supportive comments by Rosalyn Higgins as a member of the Human
Rights Committee; UN Doc. CCPR/C/SR.973 at para. 33.
245. That data centre, with whose work the present writer was involved between 1990 and
1995, produced detailed profiles on nine countries, spread over four continents, which were
under a state of emergency, or had experienced one since 1990; see online: <http://
www.law.qub.ac.uk> (accessed Feb. 16, 2000).
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predictor of widespread human rights abuses is somewhat diminished,
but even its underlying emphasis on a benchmark of notmality, to which
deviating governments must eventually return, has not always worked
effectively enough. In practical terms, placing too high an emphasis on
formally declared emergencies has often led governments to simply
move away from that concept and designate emergency measures as
ordinary laws with a view to attracting less attention from human rights
monitors. Given all these problems, it may perhaps be worthwhile to
explore alternatives to the current approach, relying somewhat less on the
formal emergency model as the basis of international control.
The case for such a reappraisal has been put by, among others, the ILA
which, despite its strong support for international measures focusing on
states of emergency, has not been oblivious to the dangers of over reliance
on such measures. In the ILA's view,
A complex web of incentives and disincentives affects resort to the formal
emergency model. The most powerful incentive is a genuine desire to
preserve the nation from an authentic threat. Formality and visibility of
emergency measures offer no guarantee that human rights abuses will not
occur, but resort to formal emergency powers is probably at least a neutral
factor in determining whether fundamental rights will be violated by a
regime perceiving genuine danger. Thus, the human rights community
must be wary of establishing a monitoring process that creates too great a
disincentive for states to choose the formal emergency model.2"
This consideration has, of course, to be balanced against the risk of
creating a monitoring process which is so lax that it encourages govern-
ments to declare states of emergency almost casually, and thus robs that
term of all meaning.
1. Preservation of the Status Quo
There is, furthermore, the question of whether the preservation, or
restoration, of the status quo should be the main desideratum in a human
rights monitor's approach to emergency regimes. What if the status quo
is fundamentally anti-democratic or antithetical to human rights, as is
often the case with autocratic or revolutionary governments? Would the
resort to emergency measures by such governments, carried out to
repulse democratic pressures, be justified, if the other pre-conditions for
the imposition of such measures were met? A literal reading of the
derogation provisions in each of the three major international human
246. ILA Second Interim Report, supra note 29 at 43.
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rights instruments would suggest an affirmative answer. 247 This question
arose, quite starkly, in the case of South Africa under the apartheid regime
where the status quo which was sought to be preserved by the imposition
of emergency measures was white minority rule. In the eyes of the human
rights community, this status quo was hardly worth preserving.
Interestingly, the question has not been the subject matter of any
formal adjudication or authoritative comment so far by any of the human
rights enforcement bodies. In one sense, it can be considered a defini-
tional matter. As one writer put it, "if we define an emergency regime in
terms of its origin in democratic politics, the democratic-authoritarian
boundary must be respected; the concept of emergency powers is largely
irrelevant in authoritarian political systems. ' 248 The ILA's solution to the
problem is to suggest that an ideal monitoring system should "create
differential disincentives for resort to emergency powers, depending
upon the character and aims of the supposedly threatened regime." Alas,
such a solution is not very practicable, as the ILA itself admits:
Such tailoring of the monitoring process will be quite difficult and
sensitive. The growing acceptance of human rights norms and monitoring
by IGOs still must be seen in light of the persistence of the Westphalian
nation-state system and its principles of equality of states and non-
interference in domestic affairs. A monitoring process precisely adjusted
to the relative bonafides of various regimes' claims to legitimacy would
likely provoke denunciation by targeted governments.
249
An obvious way forward in such circumstances might be for human
rights monitors to abandon the emphasis on the nature of the regime or the
formal status of the emergency and to focus instead solely on the human
rights violations, using some of the criteria indicated above. This may
also be an appropriate solution to deal with some of the de facto
emergencies discussed above, although it may necessitate changes to the




247. None of those provisions contains an express requirement that the measures adopted
have to be "necessary in a democratic society," as the limitation clauses attached to some of
the rights guaranteed by the instruments do.
248. A. Lijphart, "Emergency Powers and Emergency Regimes: A Commentary" (1978) 18:
4 Asian Survey 401 at 403.
249. ILA Second Interim Report, supra note 29 at 43.
250. Under the current procedures, it appears that a state-party which has refused or failed to
declare an emergency in terms of Art. 4 of the ICCPR could block any consideration of its
human rights record by the Committee under that article; see, e.g., the case of Iraq (1987), cited
in ILA Second Interim Report, supra note 29 at 6.
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2. Improving Declarations of Emergency and Notices of Derogation
Another useful reform which would make de facto emergencies less
problematic to deal with under the ICCPR would be for the Human Rights
Committee to insist that all states parties to the Covenant should make
provision in their domestic legal regimes for a formal declaration of
emergency before they seek to file notices of derogation under Article 4.
This change may not be effective against states parties determined to
escape scrutiny under that article, but it is at least likely to make some of
those that exercise de facto emergency powers fall in line with the
requirements of Article 4. That it is possible to make legislative provision
for declaration of emergencies even within the common law tradition has
been proved by the practice in countries like the United States of
America25" ' and Canada,2 52 both of which allow for emergencies to be
formally declared under either their constitutions or ordinary legislation.
Even the United Kingdom, which does not have a written constitution,
has shown itself capable of providing for the declaration of emergencies,
albeit for certain limited purposes, 253 and it should not be difficult to
extend this provision to other, more generalized, emergencies.
Assuming that the existing principle of derogation is to be maintained,
the Human Rights Committee would do well also to issue more stringent
guidelines concerning both the filing and the content of derogation
notices. 254 Firstly, the Committee should make the validity of any
derogation notice conditional upon full and prompt compliance by the
government with the notification requirement under Article 4. Secondly,
it should insist that all derogation notices are filed with utmost dispatch,
and in no case later than, say, 48 hours from the time of the declaration
251. The Constitution of the United States allows the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus
(Art. I, Sec. 9(2)) and the use of military force to suppress insurrections and repel invasions
(Art. I, Sec. 8(15)). Also, under the National EmergenciesAct 1976, the President of the United
States is required to make a formal proclamation of all emergencies and to inform Congress
of any action taken under them.
252. The 1982 Constitution of Canada requires the government to issue a proclamation of
emergency as a pre-condition to the adoption of emergency measures. A law passed in 1988,
the Emergencies Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 22 (4th Supp.), contemplates four types of emergencies:
war emergency; public order emergency; public welfare emergency; and international emer-
gency. Express provision has however been made to preserve the government's inherent power
to deal with emergencies; see s. 2(2).
253. Under the Emergency Powers Act 1920, supra note 225.
254. Valuable guidance on this subject is provided by the International Law Association's
"Queensland Guidelines"; see, International Law Association, Final Report on Monitoring
States of Emergency: Guidelines for Bodies Monitoring Respect for Human Rights During
States of Emergency (London: 1990) at 5-8.
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of the emergency. 155 Thirdly, the Committee should insist on greater
specificity as regards the content of derogation notices, requiring, at a
minimum, reasonably detailed information on the measures adopted and
their effects on basic human rights such as personal liberty, freedom of
expression, freedom of movement and freedom of association.2 16 Gov-
ernments should also be required to provide, at frequent intervals for as
long as the emergency lasts, updated statistical data on, for example,
numbers of persons detained under the emergency measures, numbers
and types of associations banned and/or publications subject to censor-
ship, numbers of security force personnel deployed to deal with the crisis,
and numbers of casualties ascribable to emergency related violence.
257
This will go a long way in eliminating the "almost contemptuous
vagueness"25 8 of derogation notices which has hitherto prevented the
Human Rights Committee from making meaningful determinations of
the legitimacy of emergencies under Article 4. Continuous re-examina-
tion and re-assessment are indispensable to any effective system of
supervision.
3. Increasing Enforcement Procedures
Other desirable reforms likely to enhance the effectiveness of the Human
Rights Committee would include the establishment of procedures whereby
all notifications addressed to the Secretary-General under Article 4(3) are
automatically and promptly transmitted to the Committee. The Commit-
tee should also be allowed to ask for special reports from derogating
governments on aspects of how an emergency is being implemented,
25 9
255. This requirement will check the currently widespread practice of governments either
failing to submit derogation notices at all or submitting such notices weeks or even months after
the emergency has been proclaimed. Under the European Convention, a delay of twelve days
to three weeks has been held to be acceptable (see the decision of the European Commission
in Lawless v. Ireland, supra note 48, and of the Court in the Greek Case, supra note 48), but
some writers have expressed dissatisfaction with this position; see, e.g., Schreuer, supra note
196 at 119.
256. There may be some merit in the suggestion that a "model" derogation notice be created
by the Human Rights Committee and/or the other treaty implementation bodies outlining the
categories of information required to be submitted by derogating governments; see, e.g.,
Queensland Guidelines, supra note 254 at 5 (Guideline 5).
257. Statistics have been asked for, and obtained, by the Committee in other contexts; see T.
Opsahl, "The Human Rights Committee" in P. Alston, ed., supra note 145 at 401 fn. 144.
However, one possible drawback of insisting on statistical data on arrests, deaths, etc. is that
governments may be tempted to resort more and more to incommunicado detention, "disap-
pearances" and extra-judicial executions. They may also, of course, furnish doctored statistics
which may be hard to verify independently.
258. Hartman, supra note 205 at 21.
259. A modest attempt in this direction was made in 1993 when the Committee amended its
rules of procedure to allow it to request governments for special reports at any time; see Official
Records of the Human Rights Committee 1992/93, UN Doc. CCPR/l2/Add. 1, Annex IX at 506.
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consider such reports in special, inter-sessional meetings, and to make
suitable recommendations aimed at ensuring better compliance with the
provisions of the Covenant.26° Such reforms were mooted by members of
the Committee themselves as far back as 1982,261 and they can all,
arguably, be accomplished without amendments to the Covenant.
262
Another proposal to enhance the fact finding capacity of the Committee,
mooted by the authors of the Siracusa Principles, is that "the Conmmittee
should develop its procedures for the consideration of communications
under the Optional Protocol to permit the hearing of oral submissions and
evidence as well as visits to States Parties alleged to be in violation of the
Covenant.
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Alternatively, it may be desirable to set up a separate body with an
exclusive mandate to deal with emergency situations. Such a body will
not only relieve the existing pressure on the Human Rights Committee,
leaving it to concentrate on its other functions, but it may also help to
achieve a degree of specialized supervision which the Committee cannot,
given its current constraints, realistically be expected to develop.264 The
new body should have wide ranging powers to, among other things,
initiate suo motu reviews of emergency situations, undertake on-site
260. Similar changes can be made to the procedure under the European Convention also,
which at present does not provide for any substantive scrutiny of derogation notices unless a
complaint of breach of the Covenant is filed under either the individual complaints procedure
or the inter-states complaints procedure.
261. See, e.g., UN Docs. CCPR/C/SR.334 and CCPR/C/SR.349. For a summary of the
discussions which took place on the subject within the Human Rights Committee see J.A.
Walkate, "The Human Rights Committee and Public Emergencies" (1982) 9 Yale J. World
Pub. Ord., 133 at 143-145.
262. The Human Rights Committee is, for instance, already empowered, under Art. 40(l)(b)
of the ICCPR, to ask states parties for reports (other than periodic reports) at any time of its
choosing. The need to use this power effectively was underlined in the Siracusa Principles,
supra note 177, Principle 73.
263. Siracusa Principles, ibid., Principle 74.
264. An idea of the effect of those constraints can be had from some sobering statistics about
the Human Rights Committee's workload relating to the examination of periodic reports: by
the end of 1996, as many as 114 countries out of 134 states-parties to the ICCPR had defaulted
in the submission of their periodic reports, some going back as far as 10 years. Even if all the
overdue reports were to be submitted without any further delay, it is estimated that it would take
the Committee some 7.6 years to consider them, on the basis of its existing resources; see Final
report on enhancing the long-term effectiveness of the United Nations human rights treaty
system (Report of the independent expert appointed by the Secretary-General) UN Doc. E/
CN.4/1997/74, paras. 37-49.
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visits, and launch urgent action appeals to curb human rights abuses.2 65
It should also be empowered to act on credible information from any
source whatsoever which may point to an emerging or ongoing crisis
situation, and to initiate action even where no formal emergency powers
have been invoked or derogations entered by the government concerned.
The latter power would be especially important to deal with de facto
emergencies.
Proposals for such a body have been mooted by, among others, the
Special Rapporteur on States of Emergency2 66 whose own mandate might
be expanded into a Working Group or other similar mechanism to
encompass the proposed new functions. The new body should serve as an
early warning system for emergencies and should be adequately resourced
if it is to perform any useful purpose. It should also work closely with the
various thematic and country specific mechanisms already in existence
and draw extensively from the information generated by them. Concur-
rently with these changes, there should be greater coordination between
the existing human rights mechanisms which deal, even if only indirectly,
with states of emergency, both within the United Nations system and
between the UN and regional systems of human rights protection. These
bodies should, in turn, cooperate more closely with NGOs active in the
protection and promotion of human rights at both national and interna-
tional levels.
A more modest immediate goal which may prove beneficial to the
ongoing efforts at moderating human rights abuses during emergencies
would be to expand the geographic coverage of the existing international
human rights instruments by persuading more and more governments to
ratify them.267 Particular attention should be given to instruments which
have implementation bodies with fact finding or adjudicatory powers,
such as the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR. Encouragement should also
be given to the creation of more such instruments, whether at regional or
global levels.
268
265. The desirability of separating responsibility for issuing urgent appeals, etc., from the
responsibility for considering reports from states-parties has been mooted by, among others,
the independent expert, who wrote: "[i]t is frustrating for a treaty body to have to remain
inactive in the face of massive violations and it risks sending a signal of impotence, perhaps
disdain and certainly marginality," ibid. at para. 79.
266. Eighth Annual Report, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1995/20, 12, para. 31.
267. Currently, nearly one in three states has yet to ratify or accede to the ICCPR - see UN
Doc. E/CN.4/1997/74 at para. 7.
268. One such instrument which is currently being drafted at the United Nations is an
Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture which aims to create a global system of
inspection of places of detention.
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4. Domestic Controls
As important as international measures of surveillance and control are,
there are obvious limitations to their effectiveness, as the experience of
their working has demonstrated over the years. Given this reality, the
focus must inevitably turn to measures of domestic supervision which, at
the end of the day, constitute a stronger bulwark against the abuse of
power during normal times and emergencies alike. As one non-govern-
mental initiative, which studied this issue in some depth in 1987, noted:
A basic requirement for preventing breaches of human rights and humani-
tarian law during situations of public emergency or internal violence is the
existence in each country of precise and effective national legislation for
dealing with such situations in a manner consistent with the rule of law.
Such legislation should include provisions establishing a national system
of control and protection against violations of human rights and humani-
tarian law during situations of public emergency or internal violence.
26 9
Self-evidently, any system of domestic control, in order to be effective,
would presuppose the existence of a measure of constitutionalism in the
country concerned. By constitutionalism is meant the principle that "the
exercise of governmental power, which is essential to the realisation of
the values of [a society], should be controlled in order that it should not
itself be destructive of the values it was intended to promote. '270 Com-
mon manifestations of this principle in modern societies include an
adherence to the rule of law, a separation of powers between the
executive, legislative andjudicial branches of government, and limits on
government.
Domestic controls on the conduct of emergencies stem essentially
from two main sources: legislative and judicial. In most countries, the
fountainhead of all emergency powers is the national-or, in the case of
a federal polity, the state-constitution, which prescribes in greater or
lesser detail the circumstances under which a state of emergency may be
brought into being, the extent of deviations permissible from the state of
normality, the degree of oversight exercisable by legislative and/or
judicial organs, and the manner in which the emergency may be brought
to an end. Specific legislative controls usually include: a requirement that
all invocations of emergency powers are approved, either beforehand or
269. Oslo Statement on Norms and Procedures in Times of Public Emergency or Internal
Violence - issued by an international workshop organized by the Norwegian Institute of
Human Rights, Oslo, 15-17 June 1987, reproduced in UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/31.
270. M.J.C. Vile, Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1967) at 1.
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soon after their introduction, by a specified majority of legislators; a duty
on the executive to seek periodic renewals of the emergency mandate;
time limits on the overall duration of the emergency; prohibitions on
certain types of law making during the emergency; and a right on the part
of the legislature to terminate the emergency at its discretion. Judicial
controls, usually less clearly spelled out, include limited powers on the
part of the courts to review emergency measures (but rarely proclama-
tions of emergency) and to issue prerogative writs such as habeas corpus
even in cases where the emergency regulations are couched in broad,
subjective terms.
The efficacy of such controls is dependant on a number of factors, not
least the precision with which the laws and regulations are formulated, the
prevailing politico-legal climate in the country, the state of public
opinion, the willingness and capacity of the relevant enforcement mecha-
nisms to strike a proper balance between the competing claims of state
security and societal freedoms, and, most of all, the degree of constitu-
tionalism present at any given time. While such controls have been seen
to work moderately well in some situations,27 1 the record of their use has,
on the whole, revealed depressingly familiar shortcomings. In a large
number of cases, legislative oversight has been scuttled either by the
prorogation 272 or dissolution273 of parliament or state assemblies during
emergencies, or by the executive managing to bulldoze measures through
such bodies by the sheer strength of its numerical majority.274 As for
judicial supervision, it has often been thwarted by a combination of legal
measures aimed at ousting the jurisdiction of the courts in sensitive
271. For example, in the United Kingdom where, in relation to the long standing conflict in
Northern Ireland, it would be fair to say there has, on the whole, been responsible and
meaningful oversight by the British Parliament of the various emergency laws, and a more than
perfunctory degree of scrutiny by the courts of executive action taken under those laws.
272. E.g., in the Philippines, where President Marcos, after declaring martial law in 1972,
postponed the convening of the legislative assembly for seven years. During the whole of that
period, he ruled by presidential decree which, he claimed, had the force of law.
273. E.g., in Burma, where the National Assembly was summarily dissolved on the declara-
tion of a state of emergency in September 1988.
274. E.g., in Malaysia, where the ruling United Malay Nationalist Organisation (UMNO)
party, which has enjoyed a two-thirds majority in parliament almost uninterruptedly since
independence, has successfully kept alive to the present day a state of emergency proclaimed
in 1969; see C.V. Das, Governments and Crisis Powers: A Legal Study On The Use Of
Emergency Powers (Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Current Law Journal Sdn. Bhd., 1996) 397.
Zimbabwe presents a more egregious example of this phenomenon; see J. Hatchard, "The
Implementation of Safeguards on the Use of Emergency Powers: A Zimbabwean Perspective"
(1989) 9 Oxford J. Legal Studies 116.
States of Emergency - Moderating their Effects on Human Rights
cases,275 extra-legal tactics such as intimidation of thejudiciary,276 and an
unfortunate tendency on the part of many judges to adopt an attitude of
relative passivity in times of political crises.
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Even so, there have been some notable examples of judicial controls
succeeding in moderating the wilder excesses of certain emergency
regimes, including de facto ones, and these serve to reinforce the
usefulness of such controls. Some of the decisions of the Brazilian and
Argentinian courts in the 1960s and 1970s, and those of the South African
courts in the 1980s, for instance, suggest that, even in fairly difficult
circumstances,judges can and do assert themselves in the cause of human
rights. The Supreme Court of Argentina ruled in a 1967 case that,
notwithstanding the express terms of a law which declared amparo
proceedings unsuitable for challenging the constitutional validity of a
statute, a citizen could still resort to those proceedings to impugn
legislation that "clearly results in violations of any human rights." It
reached this decision on the grounds that the letter of the law should not
be read so as to "impede the fulfilment of [its own] purposes. 278
Likewise, the Supreme Federal Tribunal in Brazil, dealing with a 1968
case involving the suspension by the military government of some
bankers, businessmen and a lawyer from their respective professions,
boldly treated it as a petition for habeas corpus and struck down certain
sections of the National Security Law under which the action had been
275. E.g., in India, during the 1975-77 state of emergency, when Prime Minister Indira
Gandhi succeeded in getting a pliant parliament (many of whose members had been put in jail
under draconian preventive detention laws) to pass a law which took away the right of the courts
to decide election cases involving the prime minister. Significantly, that state of emergency had
followed a decision of one of the High Courts unseating Mrs. Gandhi as a Member of
Parliament on grounds of electoral malpractices. For a reasoned critique of that emergency, see
H.M. Seervai, The Emergency, Future Safeguards and the Habeas Corpus Case: A Criticism
(Bombay: N.M. Tripathi Pvt. Ltd., 1978).
276. E.g., in Sri Lanka, where, faced with judicial assertiveness which led to a number of
judgments against the government, President Jayawardene required all superiorjudges to take
a new oath of allegiance, on pain of instant dismissal.
277. E.g., in India, where the Supreme Court timidly accepted the government's submission
during the 1975-77 state of emergency that, as long as a presidential order suspending the
enforcement of fundamental rights was in force during an emergency, the citizen had no redress
against executive arbitrariness, even where it could be shown that the act complained of was
taken in bad faith; Additional District Magistrate, Jabalpur v. Shivakant Shukla [ 1976] A.I.R.
1207 (S.C.). For a comparative study of judicial passivity in eight selected common law
jurisdictions see G.J. Alexander, "The Illusory Protection of Human Rights by National Courts
During Periods of Emergency" (1984) 5 H.R.L.J. 1. See also D.C. Kramer, "The Courts as
Guardians of Fundamental Freedoms in Times of Crisis" (1980) 2:4 Universal Human Rights 1.
278. Carlos J, Outon y otro, cited in M. Feinrider, "Judicial Review and the Protection of
Human Rights under Military Governments in Brazil and Argentina" (1981) 5 Suffolk
Transnat'l. L. Rev. 171 at 192.
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taken. It based its decision on the "right to life" (a right not expressly
guaranteed by the Brazilian Constitution), holding that "the rigours of the
measures provided for in the [National Security] law... cry out against
the essence of the human principles" inherent in the right of survival.279
The South African judiciary, in a celebrated 1962 case, refused to uphold
the apartheid government's view that legislative provisions which pro-
scribed certain named organizations for their "subversive" aims also
covered other organizations which carried out activities intended to
achieve the same aims. 280 Another example of judicial assertiveness
came, rather surprisingly, from the Philippines Supreme Court which, at
the height of the martial law government of President Marcos, ruled that
it had the authority independently to review the constitutional sufficiency
of any Presidential proclamation which suspended habeas corpus.
2 8 1
Admittedly, such examples are exceptions rather than the norm. But
they do hold out the hope of some leverage being exercised on emergency
regimes through the use of domestic control mechanisms. Efforts should
therefore be made to encourage the strengthening of such mechanisms
wherever possible. Arguably, the most helpful first step in this direction
would be to ensure the incorporation in national legal systems world wide
of international standards on such matters as independence of the judi-
ciary282 and non-derogable rights, 283 especially in countries whose gov-
ernments are reluctant to sign up to more binding treaty based standards.
Particular attention must be focused on making judicial remedies such as
habeas corpus a universally accepted non-derogable right. This goal may
require a re-ordering of priorities by international human rights agencies,
including a temporary abandonment of their ambitious plans to add other
rights and claims to the list of non-derogable rights in the ICCPR, as well
as a re-appraisal of their campaigning tactics. In particular, the human
rights community must seriously consider using the powerful weapon of
international aid-both bilateral and multilateral-to create a system of
incentives and disincentives for the adoption, especially by developing
279. Vieira Netto, cited in Feinrider, ibid. at 181-182.
280. S. v. Nokwe (1962), 3 S.A. 71 (T). The effects of this judgment were, however, soon
nullified by legislative intervention: the South African Internal Security Act was amended to
criminalize any act by any individual or group which was calculated to further the aims and
objectives of the proscribed organizations.
281. Lansang v. Garcia (1971), 42 S.C.R.A. 448. However, the Court qualified this assertion
by emphasizing that the review function was limited to checking the factual basis of the
proclamation and ensuring that the President had not overstepped his constitutional limits in
issuing it, rather than to second guess the wisdom of the Presidential action.
282. E.g., the Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, adopted by the Seventh
United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, and
endorsed by General Assembly Resolutions 40/32 and 40/146 (1985).
283. Article 4, ICCPR.
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countries, of basic minimum human rights standards. The success of this
strategy will, of course, depend heavily on whether or not the actors
involved are willing to eschew the political and ideological selectivity
which has, in the past, so plagued such efforts.The role of international pressure in bringing about domestic changes
in human rights practices cannot be underestimated. Even where the aid
weapon does not work (for example, in relation to relatively affluent
repressive regimes), other forms of pressure can and often do produce
tangible results. There is widespread agreement amongst analysts of the
Indian emergency of 1975-77, for instance that, despite her repeated and
contemptuous rejection of international calls for moderation, Mrs. Indira
Gandhi was far from impervious to foreign pressure. Her decision in
March 1977 to call a general election, even though she had succeeded in
stifling all domestic opposition to her autocratic rule, is widely attributed
to a desire on her part to burnish her democratic credentials in the eyes of
the wider world. A similar desire to be on the right side of international
opinion-or, at any rate, not to alienate it too much-was discernible in
the way the Indian government sought to blunt some of the rougher edges
of the defacto emergency between 1980-95.
Conclusion
States of emergency represent a formidable challenge to human rights
policy makers and monitors, not only because of their rapid proliferation
across the world, but also because of the continuing difficulties in
working out a coherent international strategy to rein in some of their more
complex variants. Informal or defacto emergencies have posed particu-
larly intractable problems in terms of classification and amenability to
measures of special vigilance. While a good deal of progress has been
made in recent years at both regional and global levels to moderate human
rights abuses during such emergencies, those efforts have been hampered
by a number of structural, institutional and practical problems. One
possible way of overcoming these problems might be to move away from
an exclusive focus on the emergency concept and to use the scale and
intensity of human rights abuses as the yardstick to devise measures of
international surveillance and control. It may also be well to recognize the
limitations of international action in this area, given the continuing
attachment of governments to notions of national sovereignty, and to
adopt a gradualist policy which, whilst not abandoning the search for
international solutions, places greater emphasis on strengthening domes-
tic mechanisms of control.
